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The German invasion of the Netherlands was meant to be a lightning-fast surgical strike, aimed at shoring up the right flank of the assault on France and Belgium. With a bold plan based largely on Luftwaffe air power, air-landing troops, and the biggest airborne assault yet seen, a Dutch surrender was expected within 24 hours.But the Netherlands possessed Europe's first fully integrated anti-aircraft network, as well as modern and competitive aircraft. On 10 May, the German attack was only partly successful, and the Dutch fought on for another four days. On the fifth day, with its original strategy having largely failed, the Luftwaffe resorted to terror-bombing Rotterdam to force a surrender.Explaining the technical capabilities and campaign plans of the two sides, and charting how the battles were fought, this fascinating book reassesses this little-known part of World War II. Author Ryan K. Noppen argues that while the Holland campaign was a tactical victory for Germany, the ability of the well-prepared but outnumbered Dutch to inflict heavy losses was a warning of what would come in the Battle of Britain.

Barbarossa was the biggest German invasion of World War II. Comprehensively illustrated, this study explores the air campaign that spearheaded it, and how it evolved during the rest of 1941.

An illustrated history of how the Luftwaffe intended 'the Blitz' to knock Britain out of the war, emphasising the German point of view and detailing how Britain's defences and civilians responded.The Blitz - the German 'blitzkrieg' of Britain's industrial and port cities - was one of the most intensive bombing campaigns of World War II. Cities from London to Glasgow, Belfast to Hull, and Liverpool to Cardiff were targeted in an attempt to destroy Britain's military-industrial facilities and force it out of the war.Most histories of the Blitz concentrate on the civilian experience of 'life under the bombs' or the fighter pilots of the RAF but, in military terms, the Blitz was also the Luftwaffe's biggest and most ambitious strategic bombing campaign. Focusing on both sides, this book places particular emphasis on the hitherto under-represented Luftwaffe view of the campaign and looks at the new technology and tactics at its heart. From the innovative development of specialist night-fighters to the 'Battle of the Beams' that pitted German electronic navigation systems against British countermeasures, the Blitz demonstrated the effects of developing technology on aerial warfare.Describing and analyzing the strategy, tactics and operations of both the Luftwaffe and the UK's air defences during the period between September 1940 and May 1941, author Julian Hale demonstrates that, for a variety of reasons, there was little chance of the Luftwaffe achieving any of its aims. Using primary sources, spectacular original artwork, 3D diagrams and maps, this study shines a fresh light on how and why the world's first true strategic air offensive failed.

Researched from original-language primary sources, this is a uniquely well-informed and multi-faceted history of the World War I air campaign of Bloody April.Researched from original German-, French-, and English-language sources, and written by an authority on both air and ground military operations, author, Dr James S Corum examines how Bloody April caused Allied forces to reassess their approach to the use of airpower. Considering well-known problems such as technology and training doctrine, but also how the artillery-aircraft combination ideally had to work in late-WW I ground offensives, Dr Corum analyses what each side got wrong and why. He describes little-known parts of the April campaigns, such as both sides' use of strategic bombing with heavy aircraft, and considers the German use of advanced high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with oxygen and heated suits while detailing the exploits of the infamous 'Red Baron', Manfred von Richthofen.Lessons from Bloody April not only served to improve the coordination of Allied artillery and aircraft but subsequently aircraft played a much larger role in supporting ground troops in attack mode. Bloody April paved the way for the airpower revolution that, by 1918, would make the Allies masters of the sky on the Western Front.

The story of what really led to Germany losing the battle of Stalingrad - the inability of the Luftwaffe to keep Sixth Army supplied throughout the winter of 1942-43 - and why this crucial airlift failed.Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering's failure to deliver his promise to keep Sixth Army supplied at Stalingrad was one of the most hard-hitting strategic air failures of World War II. 300 tons a day of supplies were required to sustain the Sixth Army, flown in against a Soviet fighter force whose capabilities were rapidly being transformed. The Luftwaffe's failure left Sixth Army trapped, vulnerable and too weak to attempt a breakout. The destruction of Sixth Army was one of the major turning points in World War II but the Luftwaffe's crucial role in this disaster has often been overlooked. Some claim the attempt was doomed from the beginning but, in this intriguing book, author William E. Hiestand explains how the Germans had amassed sufficient aircraft to, at least theoretically, provide the supplies needed. Demands of aircraft maintenance, awful weather and, in particular, the Soviet air blockade crippled the airlift operation. In addition, the employment of increasing numbers of modern aircraft by the Soviet Air Force using more flexible tactics, coupled with Chief Marshal Novikov's superior Air Army organisation proved decisive. The Luftwaffe did eventually recover and mounted focused operations for control of limited areas of the Eastern Front, but overall it had lost its dominance. Packed with strategic diagrams and maps, archive photos and artwork of aerial battles over Stalingrad, and including bird's eye views of Operation Winter Storm and airlift operations and tactics, this title clearly demonstrates how the Luftwaffe lost its strategic initiative in the air.

A history of the US Navy's remarkable 1945 South China Sea raid against the Japanese, the first time in history that a carrier fleet dared to rampage through coastal waters.As 1945 opened, Japan was fighting defensively everywhere. As the Allies drew closer to the Home Islands, risks of Japanese air and sea attack on the US Navy carrier force increased. US forces wanted to take the island of Luzon which provided a base for Japanese aircraft from Formosa (Taiwan) and Indochina, and from where attacks could easily be devastating for the invasion fleet. US Naval Intelligence also believed Japanese battleships Ise and Hyuga were operating out of Cam Ranh Bay. A fast carrier sweep through the South China Sea was a potential answer with the bonus that it would strike the main nautical highway for cargo from Japan's conquests in Southeast Asia.Task Force 38 would spend the better part of two weeks marauding through the South China Sea during Operation Gratitude, a month-long sweep of the area, which launched air strikes into harbors in Indochina, the Chinese coast and Formosa, while targeting shipping in the high-traffic nautical highway. By the time the Task Force exited the South China Sea, over 300,000 tons of enemy shipping and dozens of Japanese warships had been sunk. With follow-up air strikes against Japanese harbors and airfields in Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, the success of the sweep was unprecedented.Using detailed battlescenes, maps, bird's eye views, and diagrams of air strikes at Luzon, this intriguing account of Task Force 38's reign in the South China Sea proved that aircraft carriers could dominate the land-based air power of the fading Japanese. From the Korean War through to Vietnam, to the campaigns in Iraq, aircraft carriers could sail safely offshore, knowing their aircraft would prevail on both sea and land.

A new history of the most crucial few months of the Arctic Convoys, when Germany's air power forced the Allies to retreat to the cover of winter. Between spring and autumn 1942, Germany was winning the battle of the Arctic Convoys. Half of PQ-15 was sunk in May, PQ-17 was virtually obliterated in July, and in September 30 percent of PQ-18 was sunk. The Allies were forced to suspend the convoys until December, when the long Arctic nights would shield them.Mark Lardas argues that in 1942, it was Luftwaffe air power that made the difference. With convoys sailing in endless daylight, German strike aircraft now equipped and trained for torpedo attacks, and bases in northern Norway available, the Luftwaffe could wreak havoc. Three-quarters of the losses of PQ-18 were due to air attacks. But in November, the Luftwaffe was redeployed south to challenge the Allied landings in North Africa, and the advantage was lost. Despite that, the Allies never again sailed an Arctic convoy in the summer months.Fully illustrated with archive photos, striking new artwork, maps and diagrams, this is the remarkable history of the Luftwaffe's last strategic victory of World War II.

This is the history of how the mighty Gothic Line was defeated by American air power, in one of the most pivotal but least-known air campaigns of World War II.By late 1944, the Italian Campaign was secondary to the campaigns in France, and Allied forces were not strong enough to break the Germans' mighty Gothic Line. These fortifications were supplied by rail through the Alps, with trains arriving hourly and delivering 600,000 tons of supplies a month, enough to keep the German Army going forever. But in the bitter winter of 1944-45, the mighty Gothic Line would be defeated by American air power in one of the most pivotal but least-known air campaigns of World War II. It would not be a direct assault; instead Operation Bingo would ruthlessly cut the Germans' supply lines and leave them starved. However, it would not be easy. The rail routes were defended by a formidable array of heavy flak, and every raid was expected. Conditions were freezing, and even in electric flying suits, men suffered both hypoxia and frostbite.By the end of February, the previous eight-hour rail journey took the Germans 3-4 days on the wrecked railroad, and soon supplies were barely enough to keep the army alive. On April 12, the Allied ground attack began, and within ten days the German command in Northern Italy sued for surrender, the first German force in Europe to do so.Packed with first-hand accounts and rare photos from the 57th Bomb Wing Archives, this book is a fascinating history of the most successful US battlefield interdiction campaign in history, immortalized in the writing of bombardier Joseph Heller, in his novel Catch 22.

A new illustrated history of one of the key air campaigns of late World War II - the American effort to cripple Germany's oil production, and grind its armed forces to a halt.With retreating German forces losing their oilfields on the Eastern Front, Germany was reliant on its own facilities, particularly for producing synthetic oil from coal. However, these were within range of the increasingly mighty Allied air forces. In 1944 the head of the US Strategic Air Forces, General Carl Spaatz was intent on a new campaign that aimed to cripple the German war machine by depriving it of fuel. The USAAF's Oil Campaign built up momentum during the summer of 1944 and targeted these refineries and plants with its daylight heavy bombers. Decrypted German communications made it clear that the Oil Campaign was having an effect against the Wehrmacht. Fuel shortages in the autumn of 1944 forced the Luftwaffe to ground most of its combat units except for fighters involved in the defense of the Reich. Fuel shortages also forced the Kriegsmarine to place most of its warships in harbor except for the U-boats and greatly hampered German army campaigns such as the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944-45. This fascinating book packed with key photos and illustrations examines the controversies and debates over the focus of the US bombing campaign in the final year of the war, and the impact it had on the war effort overall.

An illustrated history of how Japan devised and launched a new kind of air campaign in late 1944 ΓÇô the suicidal assaults of the kamikaze units against the approaching Allied fleets.As summer changed to autumn in 1944, Japan was losing the war. Still unwilling to surrender, Japan''s last hope was to try to wear down US resolve enough to reach a negotiated settlement. Extraordinary measures seemed necessary, and the most extraordinary was the formation of Special Attack Units ΓÇô known to the Allies as the kamikazes. The concept of organized suicide squadrons was first raised on June 15, 1944. By August, formations were being trained. These formations were first used in the October 1944 US invasion of the Philippine Islands, where they offered some tactical success. The program was expanded into a major campaign over the rest of the Pacific War, seeing a crescendo during the struggle for Okinawa in April through May 1945. This highly illustrated history examines not just the horrific missions themselves, but the decisions behind the kamikaze campaign, how it developed, and how it became a key part of Japanese strategy. Although the attacks started on an almost ad hoc basis, the kamikaze soon became a major Japanese policy. By the end of the war, Japan was manufacturing aircraft specifically for kamikaze missions, including a rocket-powered manned missile. A plan for a massive use of kamikazes to defend the Japanese Home Islands from invasion was developed, but never executed because of Japan''s surrender in August 1945. Packed with diagrams, maps and 3D reconstructions of the attacks, this book also assesses the Allied mitigation techniques and strategies and the reasons and the degree to which they were successful.

A fully illustrated history of how the US Navy destroyed Truk, the greatest Japanese naval and air base in the Pacific, with Operation Hailstone, and how B-29 units and the carriers of the British Pacific Fleet kept the base suppressed until VJ-Day.In early 1944, the island base of Truk was a Japanese Pearl Harbor; a powerful naval and air base that needed to be neutralized before the Allies could fight their way any further towards Tokyo. But Truk was also the most heavily defended naval base outside the Japanese Home Islands and an Allied invasion would be costly. Long-range bombing against Truk intact would be a massacre so a plan was conceived to neutralize it through a series of massive naval raids led by the growing US carrier fleet. Operation Hailstone was one of the most famous operations ever undertaken by American carriers in the Pacific.This book examines the rise and fall of Truk as a Japanese bastion and explains how in two huge raids, American carrier-based aircraft reduced it to irrelevance. Also covered is the little-known story of how the USAAF used the ravaged base as a live-fire training ground for its new B-29s -- whose bombing raids ensured Truk could not be reactivated by the Japanese. The pressure on Truk was kept up right through 1945 when it was also used as a target for the 509th Composite Squadron to practice dropping atomic bombs and by the British Pacific Fleet to hone its pilots'' combat skills prior to the invasion of Japan.

An illustrated study of the little-known history of the failed Allied bombing campaign designed to shatter German defenses on D-Day. D-Day is one of the most written-about events in military history. One aspect of the invasion, however, continues to be ignored: the massive pre-assault bombardment by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), reinforced by RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force on June 6 which sought to neutralize the German defenses along the Atlantic Wall. Unfortunately, this failed series of attacks resulted in death or injury to hundreds of soldiers, and killed many French civilians. Despite an initial successful attack performed by the Allied forces, the most crucial phase of the operation, which was the assault from the Eighth Air Force against the defenses along the Calvados coast, was disastrous. The bombers missed almost all of their targets, inflicting little damage to the German defenses, which resulted in a high number of casualties among the Allied infantry. The primary cause of this failure was that planners at Eighth Air Force Headquarters had changed aircraft drop times at the last moment, to prevent casualties amongst the landing forces, without notifying either Eisenhower or Doolittle. This book examines this generally overlooked event in detail, answering several fundamental questions: What was the AEAF supposed to accomplish along the Atlantic Wall on D-Day and why did it not achieve its bombardment objectives? Offering a new perspective on a little-known air campaign, it is packed with illustrations, maps and diagrams exploring in detail the features and ramifications of this mission.

A rigorous new analysis of America''s legendary ΓÇ£Big Week" air campaign which enabled the Allies to gain air superiority before D-Day.In the years before the outbreak of World War II, there was a general consensus among military strategists that strategic bombing had the ability to win wars. However, no-one could foresee the devastation that German radar-directed interceptors would inflict on large bomber formations.With the increasingly urgent need to eliminate these German fighter-aircraft prior to D-Day, a concerted two-phase effort, code-named ΓÇ£Operation Argument,ΓÇ¥ was launched by USSAF. Targeting aircraft factories with hundreds of heavy bombers escorted by the new long-range P-51 Mustang, the operation, now known as the ΓÇ£Big WeekΓÇ¥ campaign, was designed to destroy aircraft production on the ground and force the Luftwaffe into combat to defend these vital facilities, allowing the new escort fighters to take their toll on the German interceptors. Packed with specially commissioned artwork and maps, this title is a detailed and fascinating analysis of ΓÇ£Big WeekΓÇ¥--history''s first ever successful offensive counterair (OCA) campaign.

An expertly written, illustrated new analysis of the Desert Storm air campaign fought against Saddam Hussein''s Iraq, which shattered the world''s fourth-largest army and sixth-largest air force in just 39 days, and revolutionized the world''s ideas about modern air power.The combat phase of the Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, was 43 days long. This consisted of a 39-day air campaign followed by a four-day armoured mechanized assault. Together they shattered what had been the world''s fourth-largest army and sixth-largest air force, and overturned conventional military assumptions about the effectiveness and value of air power.In this book, author Richard P. Hallion, one of the world''s foremost experts on air warfare, explains why Desert Storm was a revolutionary victory, a war won with no single climatic battle. Instead, victory came thanks to a rigorously planned campaign, which opened with a devastating night of attacks that shattered Iraq''s advanced air defence system, and allowed follow-on strikes in the subsequent weeks to savage Iraq''s military infrastructure and troops in the field ΓÇô largely by destroying capabilities and equipment, without massive loss of life. When the Coalition tanks finally rolled into Iraq, to widespread Iraqi surrenders, it was less an assault than an occupation.The rapid victory of Desert Storm, which surprised many observers, led to widespread military reform as the world''s advanced militaries saw the new capabilities of precision air power. The military world that we live in today reflects, to a large degree, the transformation of military power heralded by the air campaign of the 1991 Gulf War.

This illustrated study explores, in detail, the RAF's first concentrated air campaign of World War II against one of the hardest and most important targets in Germany - the industrial heartland of the Ruhr that kept Hitler's war machine running.Between March and July 1943, RAF Bomber Command undertook its first concentrated bombing campaign, the Battle of the Ruhr, whose aim was nothing less than the complete destruction of the industry that powered the German war machine. Often overshadowed by the famous 'Dambusters' single-raid attack on the Ruhr dams, the Battle of the Ruhr proved much larger and much more complex. The mighty, industrial Ruhr region contained not only some of the most famous and important arms makers, such as the gunmakers Krupp of Essen, but also many other industries that the German war economy relied on, from steelmakers to synthetic oil plants. Being such a valuable target, the Ruhr was one of the most heavily defended regions in Europe. This book examines how the brutal Ruhr campaign was conceived and fought, and how Bomber Command's relentless pursuit of its objective drew it into raids on targets well beyond the Ruhr, from the nearby city of Cologne to the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia. Drawing on a wide-range of primary and secondary sources, this is the story of the first titanic struggle in the skies over Germany between RAF Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe.

The bombing of Guernica has become a symbol of Nazi involvement in the Spanish Civil War, but the extent of the German commitment is often underestimated. The Luftwaffe sent 20,000 officers and men to Spain from 1936 to 1939, and the Condor Legion carried out many missions in support of the Spanish Nationalist forces and played a lead role in many key campaigns of the war. Aircraft that would play a significant role in the combat operations of World War II (the Heinkel 11 bomber, the Me 109 fighter, and others) saw their first action in Spain, fighting against the modern Soviet fighters and bombers that equipped the Republican Air Force. Condor Legion bombers attacked Republican logistics and transport behind the lines as well as bombing strategic targets, German bombers and fighters provided highly effective close air support for the front-line troops, and German fighters and anti-aircraft units ensured Nationalist control of the air. The experience garnered in Spain was very important to the development of the Luftwaffe. The war allowed them to hone and develop their tactics, train their officers, and to become the most practised air force in the world at conducting close support of ground troops. In effect, the Spanish Civil War proved to be the training ground for the Blitzkrieg which would be unleashed across Europe in the years that followed. In this rigorous new analysis, Legion Condor expert James Corum explores both the history and impact of the Luftwaffe's engagement during the Spanish Civil War and the role that engagement played in the development of the Luftwaffe strategy which would be used to such devastating effect in the years that followed.

Operation Tidal Wave was one of the boldest and most controversial air raids by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). At the time, the Romanian Ploesti oil fields produced about a third of all Axis oil, and was Germany's single most important fuel source. In the summer of 1943, the USAAF decided to stage a major raid on Ploesti from air bases in Libya. The resulting Operation Tidal Wave raid on 1 August 1943 was one of the costliest to date, losing 53 aircraft, about a third of the starting force. Of the more than 150 bombers that took part in the raid, only 88 B-24s returned to Libya, 55 of which were damaged. On the other hand, of the 17 Medals of Honor awarded to US soldiers and airmen from Pearl Harbor in 1941 to D-Day in 1944, 5 were awarded to pilots of the Tidal Wave mission in recognition of their extraordinary performance. Although undoubtedly bold and heroic, the mission had questionable results. Initial assessments argued that the mission caused 40% of the refinery capacity at Ploesti to be lost but subsequent studies concluded that the damage was quickly repaired and that output had exceeded August levels within a month.This new study examines the raid in detail, exploring the reasons why its dubious success came at such a high price. Supported by maps, diagrams, and full-colour artwork including battlescenes and bird's-eye views, this is the full story of the audacious Ploesti raid of 1943.

The secret history of America''s air war to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the supply routes upon which Communist victory in the Vietnam War was dependent. The Trails War formed a major part of the so-called ΓÇ£secret warΓÇ¥ in South East Asia, yet for complex political reasons, including the involvement of the CIA, it received far less coverage than campaigns like Rolling Thunder and Linebacker. Nevertheless, the campaign had a profound effect on the outcome of the war and on its perception in the USA.In the north, the Barrel Roll campaign was often operated by daring pilots flying obsolete aircraft, as in the early years, US forces were still flying antiquated piston-engine T-28 and A-26A aircraft. The campaign gave rise to countless heroic deeds by pilots like the Raven forward air controllers, operating from primitive airstrips in close contact with fierce enemy forces. USAF rescue services carried out extremely hazardous missions to recover aircrew who would otherwise have been swiftly executed by Pathet Lao forces, and reconnaissance pilots routinely risked their lives in solo, low-level mission over hostile territory. Further south, the Steel Tiger campaign was less covert. Arc Light B-52 strikes were flown frequently, and the fearsome AC-130 was introduced to cut the trails. At the same time, many thousands of North Vietnamese troops and civilians repeatedly made the long, arduous journey along the trail in trucks or, more often, pushing French bicycles laden with ammunition and rice. Under constant threat of air attack and enduring heavy losses, they devised extremely ingenious means of survival. The campaign to cut the trails endured for the entire Vietnam War but nothing more than partial success could ever be achieved by the USA. This illustrated title explores the fascinating history of this campaign, analyzing the forces involved and explaining why the USA could never truly conquer the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The campaign for Guadalcanal, which stretched from August 1942 until February 1943, centered on Henderson Field. The airfield was captured by the US on 8 August and placed into operation by 20 August. As long as the airfield was kept operational and stocked with sufficient striking power, the Japanese could not run convoys with heavy equipment and large amounts of supplies to the island. Instead, they were forced to rely on night runs by destroyers which could not carry enough men or supplies to shift the balance decisively against the American garrison on the island. The American air contingent on the island, named the 'Cactus Air Force', comprised Marine, Navy and Army Air Force units. It had the challenging mission of defending the airfield against constant Japanese attacks, and more importantly, of striking major Japanese attempts to reinforce the island. The mission of neutralizing Henderson Field fell primarily to the Imperial Navy's Air Force flying out of airfields in the Rabaul area. The units charged with this mission were among the most accomplished in the entire Imperial Navy with a high proportion of very experienced pilots and a superb air superiority fighter (the famous 'Zero'). However, the distance from Rabaul to Guadalcanal handicapped Japanese operations and their primary bomber was terribly vulnerable to interception. This book traces the air campaign from both sides and explores the factors behind the American victory and the Japanese defeat. The text is supported by full-colour illustrations and contemporary photography.

This illustrated study explores, in detail, the controversial Battle of Berlin -- RAF Bomber Command''s costly, brutal attempt to prove that strategic bombing alone could bring an end to World War II.Throughout late-1943 into early-1944, an epic struggle raged over the skies of Germany between RAF Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe. This campaign had been undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, and was baptized ΓÇ£The Battle of BerlinΓÇ¥. The Berlin campaign was a hard, desperate slog. Struggling against dreadful and bitter winter weather, Bomber Command ΓÇ£wentΓÇ¥ to Berlin a total of sixteen times, suffering increasingly severe losses throughout the winter of 1943/44 in the face of a revitalized German air-defense. The campaign remains controversial and the jury, even today, is ultimately undecided as to what it realistically achieved. Illustrated throughout with full-color artwork depicting the enormous scale of the campaign, this is the story of the RAF''s much debated attempt to win the war through bombing alone.

At the start of World War II, few thought the U-boat would be as devastating as it proved to be. But convoys and sonar-equipped escorts proved inadequate to defend the Allies' merchantmen, and the RAF's only offensive weapon was the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. For RAF Coastal Command, the first two years of the war were the hardest. Although starved of resources, operating with outdated aircraft and often useless weaponry, they were still the only force that could take the fight to the U-boats. But in these two years, the RAF learned what it needed to win the Battle of the Atlantic. Gradually developing new tactics and technology, such as airborne radar, signals intelligence, and effective weaponry, the Allies ended 1941 in a position to defeat Dönitz's growing fleet of U-boats. This book, the first of two volumes, explains the fascinating history of how the RAF kept the convoys alive against the odds, and developed the force that would prevail in the climactic battles of 1942 and 1943.

Fully illustrated with stunning full color artwork, this is the fascinating story of arguably the world''s first "modern" air campaign. Following the failure of Rolling Thunder US aircraft were now armed with new technologies such as new laser-guided bombs and electronic warfare capabilities. The Air Force now had the fearsome AC-130 gunship and a new generation of Wild Weasel anti-radar aircraft, and the US Navy aviators now had much better dogfighting training thanks to the new TOPGUN fighter school. As the Paris peace talks floundered in early 1972 and the US began to disengage from Vietnam, it was clear that the North Vietnamese were conducting a major build up for an attack into South Vietnam. Screened by bad weather and heavy air defenses in the north, the attack advanced quickly but the US quickly pushed back with an air campaign named Operation Linebacker. Their objective: defeat the invasion, preserve the government of South Vietnam, and bring the North Vietnamese back to the Paris peace talks.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was quickly followed by a rapid invasion of Malaya, a plan based entirely on the decisive use of its airpower. While the British was inadequately prepared, they likewise relied on the RAF to defend their colony. The campaign was a short match between Japanese airpower at its peak and an outgunned colonial air force, and its results were stunning.The subsequent Dutch East Indies campaign was even more dependent on airpower, with Japan having to seize a string of island airfields to support their leapfrog advance. Facing the Japanese was a mixed bag of Allied air units, including the Dutch East Indies Air Squadron and the US Far East Air Force. The RAF fell back to airfields on Sumatra in the last stages of the Malaya campaign, and was involved in the last stages of the campaign to defend the Dutch colony.For the first time, this study explores these campaigns from an airpower perspective, explaining how and why the Japanese were so devastatingly effective.

This title tells the fascinating story of World War II''s forgotten strategic bombing campaign--the RAF''s perilous, long-range missions, flying from English bases against the industry, cities, and dockyards of Mussolini''s Italy.Between June 1940 and August 1943, RAF Bomber Command undertook a little-known strategic bombing campaign in Europe. The target was Mussolini''s Italy. This air campaign was a key part of the strategic policy of Britain from 1940 to 1943, which aimed at securing Italy''s early surrender. However, it posed unique challenges, not least of which was Italy''s natural defenses of distance and the Alps. The bombing campaign against Italy can be divided into a number of phases, with each one having its own specific goals such as affecting Italian war production or hindering the Italian Navy''s war in the Mediterranean. However, each also furthered the ultimate aim of forcing Italy''s final capitulation, demonstrating that the tactic of area-bombing was not just about the destruction of an enemy''s cities, as it could also fulfill wider strategic and political objectives. Indeed, the intensity and frequency of attack was greatly controlled, and the heavy bombing of Italy was only ever sanctioned by Britain''s civilian war leaders to achieve both military and political goals. The issue of target-selection was also subject to a similar political restriction; cities and ports like Milan, Turin, Genoa, and La Spezia were sanctioned under an official Directive, but other places, such as Verona, Venice, Florence and, above all, Rome, remained off-limits. This fascinating title from British strategic and military history expert Dr Richard Worrall explores the political, motivational and strategic challenges of the campaign in full. His thorough analysis and meticulous research is supported by specially commissioned artwork, maps, and contemporary photographs.

After the failed April 1972 invasion of South Vietnam and the heavy US tactical bombing raids in the Hanoi area, the North Vietnamese agreed to return to the Paris peace talks, yet very quickly these negotiations stalled. In an attempt to end the war quickly and "persuade" the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiating table, President Nixon ordered the Air Force to send the US'' ultimate conventional weapon, the B-52 bomber, against their capital, Hanoi. Bristling with the latest Soviet air defense missiles, it was the most heavily defended target in Vietnam. Taking place in late December, this campaign was soon dubbed the "Christmas Bombings." Using specially commissioned artwork and maps, ex-USAF fighter colonel Marshall Michel describes Linebacker II, the climax of the air war over Vietnam, and history''s only example of how America''s best Cold War bombers performed against contemporary Soviet air defenses.

In 1940, the strategically vital island of Malta was Britain''s last toehold in the central Mediterranean, wreaking havoc among Axis shipping. Launching an air campaign to knock Malta out of the war, first Italy and then Germany sought to force a surrender or reduce the defenses enough to allow an invasion. Drawing on original documents, multilingual aviation analyst Ryan Noppen explains how technical and tactical problems caused the original Italian air campaign of 1940ΓÇô41 to fail, and then how the German intervention came close to knocking Malta out of the war. Using stunning full color artwork, this fascinating book explains why the attempt by the Axis powers to take the British colony of Malta ultimately failed.

A history and analysis of one of the most dramatic moments in both air power and naval history. With the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, no battleship was safe on the open ocean, and the aircraft took its crown as the most powerful maritime weaponIn late 1941, war was looming with Japan, and Britain's empire in southeast Asia was at risk. The British government decided to send Force Z, which included the state-of-the-art battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse, to bolster the naval defences of Singapore, and provide a mighty naval deterrent to Japanese aggression. These two powerful ships arrived in Singapore on 2 December - five days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But crucially, they lacked air cover. On 9 December Japanese scout planes detected Force Z's approach in the Gulf of Thailand. Unlike at Pearl Harbor, battleships at sea could manoeuvre, and their anti-aircraft defences were ready. But it did no good. The Japanese dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers were the most advanced in the world, and the battle was one-sided. Strategically, the loss of Force Z was a colossal disaster for the British, and one that effectively marked the end of its empire in the East. But even more importantly, the sinking marked the last time that battleships were considered to be the masters of the ocean. From that day on, air power rather than big guns would be the deciding factor in naval warfare.

This is a new history of the US Army Air Force''s pioneering but costly raids on Germany''s Messerschmitt and ball-bearing factories in World War II.In 1943, the USAAF and RAF launched the Combined Bomber Offensive, designed to systematically destroy the industries that the German war machine relied on. At the top of the hit list were aircraft factories and plants making ball-bearings--a component thought to be a critical vulnerability. Schweinfurt in southern Germany was home to much of the ball-bearing industry and, together with the Messerschmitt factory in Regensburg, which built Bf 109 fighters, it was targeted in a huge and innovative strike.Precision required that the targets were hit in daylight, but the raid was beyond the range of any existing escort fighter, so the B-17s would go in unprotected. The solution was to hit the two targets in a coordinated "double-strike," with the Regensburg strike hitting first, drawing off the defending Luftwaffe fighters, and leaving the way clear for the Schweinfurt bombers. The Regensburg force would carry on over the Alps to North Africa, the first example of US "shuttle bombing."Although the attack on Regensburg was successful, the damage to Schweinfurt only temporarily stalled production, and the Eighth Air Force had suffered heavy losses. It would take a sustained campaign, not just a single raid, to cripple the Schweinfurt works. However, when a follow-up raid was finally launched two months later, the losses sustained were even greater. This title explains how the USAAF launched its daylight bombing campaign in 1943, the technology and tactics available for the Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions, and how these costly failures forced a change of tack.

Japan 1944-45 examines the only time in history that a major war was ended by the use of air power. It shows how the United States used a combination of industrial capability and geography to devastate Japan from the air, and why the Japanese, despite a promising start to their defense, proved unable to prevent the XXIst Air Force from destroying their country. Since the early 1930s air power advocates had claimed that aerial bombardment alone could defeat a nation. Yet by January 1945, while it had been the key to winning ground campaigns, from the German Blitzkrieg to the Allies'' advance across the Pacific, air power had failed to demonstrate their most audacious claim: that strategic bombing, by itself, could win a war.The United States sought to prove it by reducing the Japanese Home Islands'' military and industrial capability through bombing alone until they had to surrender.