Bøker i Cambridge Studies in Philosophy-serien

Derk Pereboom argues that our best scientific theories have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform, and that because of this, we are not morally responsible for any of them. In addition, adopting this perspective would provide significant benefit for our lives.

Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Arturs Logins develops and defends a new theory: the Erotetic view of reasons, according to which normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative why questions (Why should I do this?). This theory draws on evidence of how why-questions work in informal logic, language and philosophy of science. The resulting view is able to avoid the problems of previous accounts, while retaining all of their attractive features, and it also suggests exciting directions for future research. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The assumption of materialism (in its many forms) Howard Robinson believes is false. In his book he presents a very forceful critique of the modern forms that materialism has taken. In telling discussions of the theory of supervenience put forward by Davidson and Peacocke, the central state materialism attributable to Smart, Armstrong and others, Putnam's functionalism, and Rorty's disappearance theory, he shows that, whatever their local inconsistencies, these forms of materialism all overlook or quite inadequately explain elementary and unimpeachable intuitions about our own mental experiences. Robinson concludes with a consideration of the alternative views of the matter of which the mind is held to consist. These arguments will either serve to crystallise for the most part inchoate opposition to materialism among a number of philosophers, and will challenge its proponents to find a more secure defence for the basis of their view.

In this study William Lyons presents a sustained and coherent theory of the emotions, and one which draws extensively on the work of psychologists and physiologists in the area. Dr Lyons starts by giving a thorough and critical survey of other principal theories, before setting out his own 'causal-evaluative' account. In addition to giving an analysis of the nature of emotion - in which, Dr Lyon argues, evaluative attitudes play a crucial part - his theory throws light on the motivating role of emotions in our lives, our attitudes towards our emotions and our responsibility for them.

A study in the philosophy of science, proposing a strong form of the doctrine of scientific realism' and developing its implications for issues in the philosophy of mind.

Henry Kyburg Jr proposes here an original, carefully worked out theory of the foundations of measurement, to show how quantities can be defined, why certain mathematical structures are appropriate to them and what meaning attaches to the results generated. Crucial to his approach is the notion of error.

The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action.

This 1996 book is the result of a uniquely productive union of philosophy, psychoanalysis and anthropology, and explores the complexity and importance of emotions. It offers a realistic account of emotions and an in-depth analysis of how psychological factors affect judgments of all kind.

Asay's book offers a new perspective on the age-old question 'What is truth?', one which promises to shake up contemporary views, and yet is rooted in the very origins of analytic philosophy. For all those interested in the philosophy of language, and metaphysics.

Fumerton makes a powerful case for the rehabilitation of the knowledge argument for dualism - the observation that we can know the truth that we exist without knowing any truths about the physical world. The book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny (or both). Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain away' familiar objects project downwards, onto the tiny entities, structures and features of familiar objects themselves.

Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities to present a dualistic view of the mind that goes against the dominant materialist views. This book will interest students and professionals working in the philosophy of mind and will have cross-disciplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences.

This collection of essays presents the core of the work of influential philosopher Jaegwon Kim.

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions.

Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued.

What makes the words we speak mean what they do? M. J. Cresswell answers this question in a book-length examination of the connection between meaning and linguistic behaviour from the point of view of possible-worlds semantics.

In this book, Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply 'counting in favour of' action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular and moral theory more generally.

Michael Zimmerman provides a highly original account of moral obligation and moral responsibility that is sharply at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His book will be of significant interest to a wide range of readers in ethics.

In this book Bennett Helm proposes an innovative theory of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is a vision of what it is to be a responsible agent.

This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression.

What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Annette Barnes offers a challenge to the standard characterization of other-deception and characterizations of self-deception, exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness and the irrationality of self-deception.

This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with both Empiricists and Externalists, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive and proposition-like, and that meaning is determined 'in the head'.

Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory that both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning.

Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge and questions the assumption that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. His innovative book will appeal to all readers interested in moral philosophy.

In acknowledging an ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, this book develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism in epistemology, on the other.

Dr Cargile offers here an original and sustained treatment of a range of issues and in fact presents an unfashionable defence of a platonistic ontology. The book should interest, and may well surprise, philosophers and others concerned with semantics and the foundations of logic.

This is a book about the concept of a physical thing and about how the names of things relate to the things they name. It questions the prevalent view that names 'refer to' or 'denote' the things they name.

This study is an unusual contribution to the philosophy of mind in that it argues for the sometimes unfashionable view of dualism: that mind and matter are distinct and separate entities as Descartes believed.