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How can a system of criminal punishment be justified? In particular can it be justified if the moral demand that we respect each other as autonomous moral agents is taken seriously? The conclusion is pessimistic: punishment cannot be justified within our legal system; and this gap between the ideal and the actual presents us with serious moral dilemmas.

In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'.

Logi Gunnarsson's innovative book on the rational credentials of morality includes substantial critical engagement with thinkers from two very different philosophical traditions, and is notable for its clear and succinct account of Habermas' discourse ethics.

This book examines the philosophical foundations of the realist view of the progress of science as cumulative. It is a view that has recently been faced with a number of powerful attacks in which successive scientific theories are seen, not as extending their scope and honing their explanations, but as incommensurable.

Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature.

This book presents an original theory of the nature of pictorial representation. The most influential recent theory of depiction holds that the relation between depictions and what they represent is entirely conventional. Flint Schier argues to the contrary that depiction involves resemblance to the things depicted.

This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription.

This book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.

This is a book about moral reasoning: how we actually reason and how we ought to reason. It defends a form of 'rule' utilitarianism whereby we must sometimes judge and act in moral questions in accordance with generally accepted rules. The author opposes the currently more fashionable view that it is always right for the individual to do that which produces the most good.

Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind.

This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years.

Raymond Martin has written a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the nature of the self, personal identity, and survival. It builds bridges between analytic and phenomenological traditions and thus opens up a new field of investigation.

In contrast to facts, values and morality seem insecure, influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to values and morality? In this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective values and moral knowledge.

This book is a philosophical study of the relations between hearing and thinking about music. By applying the concepts and techniques of analytic philosophy the author explores the ways in which musical hearing may be described as nonconceptual, and how such mental representation contrasts with conceptual thought.

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. His comprehensive account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy.

In Goodness and Justice, Joseph Mendola develops a unified moral theory that defends the hedonism of classical utilitarianism, while evading utilitarianism's familiar difficulties by adopting two modifications. His theory incorporates a developed form of consequentialism.

John Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics.

The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or 'folk') psychology in general.

David Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions.

Marcel Lieberman examines the conditions under which commitment is possible, and offers at the same time an indirect argument for moral realism. His ambitious study addresses questions that are of great interest to analytic philosophers but also makes many connections with continental philosophy, folk psychology and cognitive science.

Second part of a three-volume collection of most of David Lewis's papers in philosophy. This second volume is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology. The papers are offered here in a readily accessible form, disseminating the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher.

In this challenging study, Andre Gallois examines issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, and advances a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states.

This provocative book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time.

A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science.

If either determinism or indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong, to perform some action only if one has control over it. This dilemma can be evaded, because moral obligation is incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism.

Defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other.

This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan.

This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human mind to arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world on the basis of pure reason without any dependence on sensory experience. Laurence BonJour presents the most comprehensive exposition and defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.

This book espouses a theory of scientific realism in which due weight is given to mathematics and logic. The authors argue that mathematics can be understood realistically if it is seen to be the study of universals, of properties and relations, of patterns and structures, the kinds of things which can be in several places at once.

Develops a theory of value that seeks to reconcile reason with passions, and explores how this grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of just maximizing one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values.