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Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate.

The issue of whether or not there is a God is one of the oldest and most widely disputed philosophical questions. In this book two philosophers, each committed to unambiguous versions of belief and disbelief, debate the central issues of atheism and theism.

* Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. * Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology while engaging in contemporary debates. * Written by two of today's foremost epistemologists.

Is belief in God epistemically justified? That's the question at the heart of this volume in the Great Debates in Philosophy series, with Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley each addressing this fundamental question with distinctive arguments from opposing perspectives.

This volume brings three forms - Kantian ethics, consequentialism and virtue ethics - of ethical theory into critical relationship, and it does so in terms that should engage current philosophical debate and yet be clear enough for undergraduates.

The unique approach taken within The Ethics of Patriotism brings together the differing perspectives of three leading figures in the philosophical debate who deliver an up-to-date, accessible, and vigorous presentation of the major views and arguments.

Philosophical controversies within contemporary critical theory arise largely from questions about the nature, scope and limits of human reason. As the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy has increasingly given way to a sociocritical turn, traditional ideas of 'pure' reason have been left further and further behind.

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.