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The last decade or so has seen a strong renewal of interest in Kant's Legal Philosophy. The current volume brings together essays by leading Kantians along with distinguished contemporary legal and moral philosophers.

In the last few years there has been an increasing interest in virtue theory among legal scholars. 'Virtue jurisprudence' has emerged as a serious candidate for a theory of law and adjudication. This book explores the relevance of virtue theory to law from a variety of perspectives.

Voyiakis argues that private law aims to articulate acceptable principles as to when our institutions can hold agents accountable for their choices.

This book traces the developments that established legal positivism as an almost insurmountable horizon in legal theory. But it also attempts to show that modern positivism's enduring success is due to the gradual abandonment of its core position on law's moral indifference, which, paradoxically, renders it less and less positivistic.

This book fills a major gap in the ever-increasing secondary literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought by providing a dedicated and coherent treatment of the many, various and interesting things which Arendt had to say about law.

This book presents an argument for the existence of moral rights held by groups and a resulting account of how to reconcile group rights with individual rights and with the rights of other groups.

This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality.

The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined.

This book suggests that the common conception of law (the legislature creates the law: courts apply it) should be abandoned, offering an alternative framework building on Dworkin's interpretive theory of law.

The last decade or so has seen a strong renewal of interest in Kant's Legal Philosophy. The current volume brings together essays by leading Kantians along with distinguished contemporary legal and moral philosophers.

This book uses the 'Lorry Driver Paradox', a novel puzzle, to explore and clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, to break new ground in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI), and to connect moral philosophy, legal theory, and AI ethics. It supports a 'legal turn', i.e. the idea that an inquiry into legal responsibility can guide an inquiry into moral responsibility, and not just the other way around.It presents a novel conception of strict answerability, as opposed to strict liability, and argues that taking responsibility is a genuine normative power, like consenting or promising. It elaborates on the moral significance of apologies in our social and legal practices. The book presents a paradox-driven methodology, through a combination of legal and philosophical perspectives, and provides solutions to challenges around 'responsibility gaps' and trustworthy AI.