Bøker i Oxford Moral Theory-serien

The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.

In thirteen new essays and an introduction, Motivational Internalism collects a structured overview of current debates about motivational internalism and examines the nature of and evidence for forms of internalism, internalism's relevance for moral psychology and moral semantics, and ways of bridging the gap between internalist and externalist positions.

Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.

This volume contains selected essays in moral and political philosophy by Thomas Hurka.

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.

Vayrynen argues that thick concepts - such as lewd and rude, selfish and cruel, courageous and kind - are evaluative only as a matter of pragmatics. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning, they cannot have the deep and distinctive significance they are often given in moral philosophy.

Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.

Undeniably, life is unfair. So, why play fairly in an unfair world? The answer comes from combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness with a modern conception of self-respect. The book is about why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens in between.

Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.

In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.

Building on a careful truth-conditionalist semantics for 'ought' considered as a modal word, Chrisman argues that ought-sentences mean what they do neither because of how they describe reality nor because of the noncognitive attitudes they express, but because of their inferential role.

What does it mean to be a morally good person? Pleasure, emotion, and attention are also important parts of our moral character despite being involuntary inner states. Inner Virtue argues that such states can be morally virtuous or vicious by manifesting our deepest cares and concerns.

Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.

Consequentialism is a focal point of moral philosophy. Recently, new wave consequentialists have presented theories which proved extremely flexible and powerful in meeting influential objections. The volume explores new directions within this project, raises fundamental problems for it, and gives a balanced assessment of its scope in commonsense moral practice.

When making decisions, we ought to choose the option that is best in terms of what ultimately matters. However, knowing what ultimately matters is not always enough when it comes to knowing what we ought to do. In Opting for the Best, Douglas Portmore examines the questions that remain after we have determined what matters. In doing so, he engages with some of the most complex puzzles concerning what we ought to do, including those involving supererogation,indeterminate or overdetermined outcomes, predictable future misbehavior, among others.

Is morality fixed objectively, independently of all human judgment, or do we "invent" right and wrong? Articulating the Moral Community argues that neither of these simple answers is correct. Its central thesis is that, working within zones of objective indeterminacy, the moral community-the community of all persons-has the authority to introduce new moral norms.