Bøker i Oxford Philosophical Monographs-serien

C S Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. This book argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements for a suitable account of truth.

This book presents a new theory of probability applicable to general reasoning, science, and the courts. From a strongly subjective starting-point, with probabilities viewed simply as the guarded beliefs one can reasonably hold, the theory shows how such beliefs are legitimately 'projected' outwards as if they existed in the world independent of our judgements.

Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention since the 1990s, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Christian Illies argues that transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements.

The author defends a conception of language as essentially a means for the reception of knowledge through testimony. He finds this account in the work of classical Indian philosophers of language, and presents a detailed analysis of their theories, with emphasis of the work of Gaddhara.

A monograph devoted exclusively to Kant's theory of the sublime, a subject currently witnessing a revival amongst European philosphers in relation to debates about the nature of postmodernism.

Sarah Gibbons here departs from previous scholarship on Kant by demonstrating the centrality of imagination to Kant's philosophy as a whole. She shows that imagination performs a vital function in `bridging gaps' between the different elements of cognition and experience. Thus, the role imagination plays in Kant's works expresses his fundamental insight into the complexity of human cognition.

Kant claimed that transcendental idealism yields a form of realism at the empirical level. The author offers a presentation and rehabilitation of this empirical realism, that places his realist credentials at the centre of the account of representation offered in "The Critique of Pure Reason".

This book casts new light on the debate about moral responsibility and determinism. The author explores the relationship between deprivation and desert, argues that the traditional view of the debate should be abandoned, and suggests acceptance of a new compatibilist approach which will meet the needs of justice more fully than the usual proposals.