Bøker i Practical Philosophy-serien

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

Der moralische (oder praziser: der metaethische) Relativismus erfreut sich auerhalb philosophischer Fachkreise groer Beliebtheit. Innerhalb der akademischen Philosophie steht der Relativismus dagegen in denkbar schlechtem Rufe. Die Fachdiskussion beschrankt sich zumeist darauf, den Relativismus mit Bezug auf semantische Uberlegungen wieder aus der Debatte zu verbannen, um sich dann den angeblich wirklich relevanten Alternativen in der Metaethik zuzuwenden (Realismus, Irrtumstheorie, Expressivismus). Diese Arbeit bemuht sich darum, den metaethischen Relativismus als ernstzunehmende Position innerhalb der metaethischen Debatte zu etablieren. Teil I handelt zunachst von den Grunden, an einem Objektivismus in der Moral zu zweifeln. Argumente gegen den Objektivismus werden kritisch untersucht und teils verworfen, teils als stichhaltig herausgestellt. Teil II wendet sich im Anschluss an aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Semantik den theoretischen Ressourcen zu, die der metaethische Relativismus zur Verteidigung gegen das sogenannten "e;Argument aus der verlorenen Meinungsverschiedenheit"e; nutzen kann. Die These der Arbeit lautet: Es gibt Grund am Objektivismus zu zweifeln und der Relativismus stellt eine plausible Alternative dar.

Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections to this view. This book adopts a different approach: It attempts to highlight the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism by presenting a positive prima facie argument in its favour. The book starts by clarifying the relation between political perfectionism - a conception of politics - and prudential perfectionism and ethical perfectionism - a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. It is crucial to start by selecting a plausible form of ethical perfectionism, as it makes an important difference to the plausibility of the political conception based upon it. Once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed, many of the standard objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target. Different arguments in favour of liberal perfectionism are then proposed and critically examined, but the resilience of some pragmatic arguments against liberal perfectionism is conceded. The book ends by showing that perfectionism can be surprisingly relevant for discussions of social justice and proceeds to draw a sketch of the perfectionist implications for questions of distributive justice.

How come we ought to do things? How come that some of our action alternatives come with a practical relevance ¿ oughtness ¿ that others lack? What is the origin of oughtness? This investigation analyzes and evaluates four different answers, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). Drawing on the insights from this evaluation, it develops a new desire-based theory of oughtness: metaethical conativism.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

Unless considered on a practical level, where a precise distribution of social goods is chosen, John Rawls's and Gerald Cohen's approaches to social justice cannot be complementary. Their disagreement about justice and its principles calls for a choice, which opts either for the Rawlsian theory or for the Cohenian one. What is the more plausible approach to social justice? This work compares both approaches and aims to defend Cohen's position in the light of two considerations. It answers the philosophical question about the analysis of the idea of justice, which puts the virtue of justice in its philosophical context. It, however, presents a method everyone can apply in order to arrive at the fundamental principles of justice by employing the power of reason. An analysis of the concept of justice based on the power of reason should seek to uncover the ultimate nature of justice, which is independent of facts and of other virtues. Once exposed, the understanding of justice arrived at should inform social institutions and determine people's daily decisions. A just society is therefore a society where just persons and just institutions exhibit the virtue of justice.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

Ethics of Humanitarian Interventions

Contains original essays from both sides of the debate. Representing a range of metaethical views, this title helps you develop diverse accounts of normativity and discuss what it means for a concept to be natural.

Explaining Altruism: A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits

This book presents an answer to the question of why modern legal institutions and the idea of citizenship are important for leading a free life. The majority of views in political and legal philosophy regard the law merely as a useful instrument, employed to render our lives more secure and to enable us to engage in cooperate activities more efficiently. The view developed here defends a non-instrumentalist alternative of why the law matters. It identifies the law as a constitutive feature of our identities as citizens of modern states. The constitutivist argument rests on the (Kantian) assumption that a person's practical identity (its normative self-conception as an agent) is the result of its actions. The law co-constitutes these identities because it maintains the external conditions that are necessary for the actions performed under its authority. Modern legal institutions provide these external prerequisites for achieving a high degree of individual self-constitution and freedom. Only public principles can establish our status as individuals who pursue their life plans and actions as a matter of right and not because others contingently happen to let us do so. The book thereby provides resources for a reply to anarchist challenges to the necessity of legal ordering.