Bøker i Studies in Brain and Mind-serien

What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett¿s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind.Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett¿s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive psychiatry.

This book examines the concept of " Neurosemantics", a term currently used in two different senses: the informational meaning of the physical processes in the neural circuits, and semantics in its classical sense, as the meaning of language, explained in terms of neural processes.

This book is an edited collection of papers from international experts in philosophy and psychology concerned with time.

This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011.

This volume brings together new papers advancing contemporary debates in foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. The book also highlights the metaphysical challenges raised by recent neuroscience and demonstrates the relation between neuroscience and mechanistic philosophy.

This volume brings together new papers advancing contemporary debates in foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. The book also highlights the metaphysical challenges raised by recent neuroscience and demonstrates the relation between neuroscience and mechanistic philosophy.

This volume focuses on the emergent field of neuroethics comparing and contrasting how two democracies, Canada and the United States, have begun adapting public policy design to better fit human minds. The book focuses on issues relevant to all members of the general population and discusses a series of policy issues arranged roughly in the order in which they become relevant in a typical person's lifetime. After the introductory chapter each chapter considers an area of public policy particularly relevant to a different stage of life-from early childhood education policy, to policies for higher education and the workplace, to end of life decisions in living wills and advance directives.    The author puts forth that making the shift towards more neurologically appropriate policy will likely be a gradual process hampered primarily by two issues. The first is the inability of neuroscientists to come to agreement on increasingly sophisticated research findings. The second issue points out that bringing policy and neurology into a more synchronous relationship requires a commitment to prolonged effort involves the largely unrecognized reality of entrenched neurological interests.   The first chapter introduces the concept of disconnect between policy design with traditional understandings of the brain and goes on to highlight developments in the science of human neurology in recent years. To help contextualize the book, examples of neurological misperceptions are explored in this introductory chapter. Chapters Two through Eleven each explores a specific type of policy, incorporating understandings of the human brain which, modern neuroscience suggests, are debatable.

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal. Kohar focuses on the explanatory relevance of representational content in constitutive mechanistic explanations typical in cognitive neuroscience. The work significantly contributes to two areas of literature: 1) the debate between representationalism and non-representationalism, and 2) the literature on mechanistic explanation.Kohar begins with an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience.