Bøker av Catherine Z. Elgin

An ecological epistemology arguing that epistemic agents, communities, and environments adapt to one another to generate evolving understandings of the world.Mainstream epistemology focuses on static states. In Epistemic Ecology, Catherine Elgin adopts a dynamic stance, viewing epistemic subjects as agents rather than onlookers. She examines how, individually and collectively, we construct our epistemic practices, policies, principles, and procedures to overcome our limitations, exploit our assets, and correct our mistakes. Taking an ecological approach, she shows how human organisms and their social and natural environments mutually adjust to accommodate each other. Elgin’s ecological model of understanding reveals that epistemic agents and communities are interdependent and are more deeply implicated in the individuation and characterization of the phenomena they access than standard spectatorial approaches to epistemology assume. Elgin maintains that a commitment’s epistemic acceptability turns in large part on its providing resources for further epistemic advancement. Epistemic progress is an iterative process that corrects, refines, and extends current understanding. Epistemic subjects are agents, not mere observers, and the positions they accept are springboards for improvement rather than windows into the world.  Responsible disagreement is an asset because it has the potential to identify and correct shortfalls in the views that are currently accepted.  Rather than treat epistemic success—knowledge, understanding, wisdom—as fixed and final, Elgin views success as a stable platform on which to build. How, she asks, should we leverage our findings to move beyond them? Her holistic conception of understanding is integral to education.

Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns. Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview--one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief.