Bøker av Dirk Barreveld

On December 8, 2014, an Embraer EMB-500 airplane (marketed as the Phenom 100), N100EQ, crashed while on approach to runway 14 at Montgomery County Airpark (GAI), Gaithersburg, Maryland. The airplane impacted three houses and the ground about 3/4 mile from the approach end of the runway. The pilot, the two passengers, and the three people in a nearby house died as a result of the accident. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's conduct of an approach in structural icing conditions without turning on the airplane's wing and horizontal stabilizer deice system, leading to ice accumulation on those surfaces, and without using the appropriate landing performance speeds for the weather conditions and airplane weight, as indicated in the airplane's standard operating procedures, which together resulted in an aerodynamic stall at an altitude at which a recovery was not possible.

On October 31, 2014, the SpaceShipTwo (SS2) reusable suborbital rocket, N339SS, which was operated by Scaled Composites LLC. SS2 crashed and broke up into multiple pieces during a rocket-powered test flight and impacted terrain over a 5-mile area near Koehn Dry Lake, California. The pilot received serious injuries, and the copilot received fatal injuries. SS2 was destroyed, and no one on the ground was injured as a result of the falling debris. SS2 had been released from its launch vehicle, WhiteKnightTwo, N348MS, about 13 seconds before the structural breakup. Scaled was operating SS2 under an experimental permit issued by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) according to the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 437. Safety issues include the lack of human factors guidance for commercial space operators, the efficacy and timing of the pre-application consultation process, limited interactions between the FAA/AST and applicants during the experimental permit evaluation process, missed opportunities during the FAA/AST's evaluations of hazard analyses and waivers from regulatory requirements, limited inspector familiarity with commercial space operators, an incomplete commercial space flight database for mishap lessons learned, and the need for improved emergency response planning. Safety recommendations are addressed to the FAA and the Commercial Spaceflight Federation.

On Tuesday 24 March 2015, the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX operated by Germanwings took off from Barcelona, Spain, at 09:00 with destination Düsseldorf, Germany. At 09:41, the aircraft crashed into the mountains northeast of Marseille. The investigation into the causes of the crash revealed that the co-pilot, at a moment when he was alone in the cockpit, had deliberately flown the plane into the mountains killing all 150 persons on board. The investigation revealed also that the co-pilot was under medical treatment for depressions by several health care providers. Neither of those providers informed any aviation authority, nor any other authority about the co-pilot's mental state. No action could have been taken by the authorities and/or his employer to prevent him from flying on the day of the accident, because they were not informed about the co-pilot's mental state of mind.

On 31 August 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747, departed John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, United States, on a scheduled flight for Seoul, Republic of Korea. The flight had 269 persons on board. Soon after departure from Anchorage, Alaska, KE 007 deviated to the right (north) of its direct track, this deviation resulted in penetration of Sovjet Russian air space. Military aircraft operated by the USSR attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula. The interception attempts were unsuccessful. Upon approaching Sakhalin Island, USSR, the flight was intercepted by USSR military aircraft and shot down on the assumption that is was a United States RC-135 (spy) aircraft. There were no survivors.

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, lost a cargo door as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 355 persons aboard. As a result of the incident nine of the passengers were ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. The cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990. The probable cause of this accident was a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.

On April 6, 1993, a China Eastern Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-11, flight 583, on its way from Beijing, China, to Los Angeles, California, had an inadvertent deployment of the leading edge wing slats while in cruise flight, not far from Shemya, Alaska. The autopilot disconnected, and the captain was manually controlling the airplane when it progressed through several violent pitch oscillations and lost 5,000 feet of altitude. Two passengers were fatally injured, and 149 passengers and 7 crewmembers received various injuries. The airplane did not receive external structural damage, but the passenger cabin was substantially damaged. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate design of the flap/slat actuation handle by the Douglas Aircraft Company that allowed the handle to be easily and inadvertently dislodged from the UP/RET position, thereby causing extension of the leading edge slats during cruise flight.