Bøker av Dominik Perler

Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a mereological analysis of the soul. Their starting point was a simple observation: we tend to describe the soul of human beings by referring to different types of activities (perceiving, imagining, thinking, etc.). Each type of activity seems to be produced by a special part of the soul. But how can a simple, undivided soul have parts? Classical thinkers gave radically different answers to this question. While some claimed that there are indeed parts, thus assigning an internal complexity to the soul, others emphasized that there can only be a plurality of functions that should not be conflated with a plurality of parts. The eleven chapters reconstruct and critically examine these answers. They make clear that the metaphysical structure of the soul was a crucial issue for ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers.

Aristotlea (TM)s "De anima" shaped philosophical debates far beyond the Middle Ages and gave rise to a number of theories about the nature of the soul, its various functions and its relation to the body. The ten contributions to this book, a special issue of the journal "Vivarium," examine some of these theories in the period between Albertus Magnus and Descartes. They pay particular attention to the question of how the metaphysical status of the soul and its parts was explained, and analyze Aristotelian accounts of cognitive activities such as perceiving, imagining and thinking. The ten case studies focus both on defenders of the Aristotelian paradigm and on its critics, arguing that one should not look for a moment of break with Aristotelianism, but for various stages of transformation. Contributors are Lilli Alanen, Joel Biard, Jean-Baptiste Brenet, Richard Cross, Dag Hasse, Peter King, Ian Mclean, Martin Lenz, Lodi Nauta, Dominik Perler and Markus Wild.