Bøker av Maria Vagliasindi

Given the chronic power shortages faced by numerous developing countries, and the need everywhere to keep pace with demand, understanding the drivers of public private partnerships (PPPs) in energy is critical. While many private electricity projects have been delayed and financing costs have increased, the impact of the global financial crisis was less severe than that of previous crises that originated in developing countries. This resilience stems from developing countries need to expand generation capacity, electricity sector reforms and better regulatory frameworks, and short-term solutions (such as rental power plants). The study reports the evidence from statistical analysis and a sample of case studies selected based. It proposes a novel analytical approach to model PPPs, using a two-stage procedure based on Heckmans sample selection distinguishing between those factors that determine whether private investment in energy takes place, and those that influence the volume of investment. The results of the analysis provide the following conclusions: Both general governance and regulatory instrument primarily affect investors decisions to enter the various power sector markets, not the subsequent level of investment indicating that investors seem to be adequately protected against risks. Support mechanisms, like feed-in tariffs, are crucial for attracting investors in renewable generation, but they do not succeed in displacing fossil fuel investment and they could play a bigger role in affecting the level of investment in renewables. There is a significant trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency of alternative instruments for deploying renewables. Feed-in tariffs tended to be quite effective but to be set on the high side, reducing incentives to cut costs and posing significant strains on already stripped national budgets. Competitive auctions, on the other hand have tended to be efficient but initially low and not always the most effective instrument. Countries can scale up renewables following different paths. For Brazil, the move from feed-in tariffs to auctions enabled it to both reduce costs and deploy additional capacity. Peru followed in Brazils path, opting for auctions instead of introducing feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, Chinas move from competitive tenders to feed-in tariffs allowed for discovery effects to determine the right level of prices to attract private investment in renewables.

Poorly implemented energy subsidies are economically costly to taxpayers and damage the environment. This report aims at providing the emerging lessons form a representative sample of case studies in 20 developing countries that could help policy makers to address implementation challenges, including overcoming political economy and affordability constraints. The sample has selected on the basis of a number of criteria, including the countryOCOs level of development (and consumption), developing country region, energy security and the fuel it subsidies (petroleum fuel, electricity, natural gas). The case studies were supported by data collection related to direct budgetary subsidies, fuel and electricity tariffs, and household survey data.The analysis provides strong evidence of the success of reforms in reducing the associated fiscal burden. For the sample of countries, the average energy subsidy recorded in the budget was reduced from 1.8% in 2004 to 1.3%GDP in 2010. The reduction of subsidies is particularly remarkable for net energy importers. Pass-through of international fuel prices was also notable in the case of electricity generated by fossil fuel. For the sample of countries, the average end-user electricity tariff increased by 50%, from USD 6 cents in 2002 to USD 9 cents per kWh in 2010.In spite of the relatively price inelastic demand for gasoline and diesel, fossil fuel consumption in the road sector (per unit of GDP) declined in the 20 countries examined from 53 (44) in 2002 to about 23 kt oil equivalent per million of GDP in 2008 in the case of gasoline (Diesel). The most notable decline in consumption was recorded in the low and lower middle income countries. This reflects the much higher rate of growth in GDP in this group of countries and underlines the opportunities to influence future consumption behavior rather than modifying the existing consumption patterns, overcoming inertia and vested interests. Similar trends are recorded for power consumption.While there is no one-size-fits-all model for subsidy reform, implementation of compensatory social policies and an effective communication strategy, before the changes are introduced, reduces helped with the implementation of reforms."

The current distribution of power markets around intermediate structures between full integration and unbundling suggests that there has not been a linear path to reform in practice. Instead, many developing countries may retain intermediate structures in the foreseeable future. This possibility exposes a large gap in understanding about power market structures, since most theoretical work has focused on the two extreme structures and there is limited evidence on the impact of unbundling for developing countries.The study reports the evidence from statistical analysis and a representative sample of twenty case studies selected based on the initial conditions, such as income and power system size. It proposes a novel analytical approach to model market structure, together with ownership and regulation, controlling for several variables, as a key determinant of performance across several indicators, including access, operational and financial performance and environmental sustainability. The results of the analysis provide the following conclusions for policy guidance on power market restructuring for developing countries: There seems to be credible empirical basis for selecting a threshold power system size and per capita income level below which unbundling of the power supply chain is not expected to be worthwhile. Indeed a dichotomy emerges between high income countries characterized by a large system size for which unbundling and other reforms are significantly linked to better performance and low income countries characterized by small system power size for which there is no strong evidence that unbundling and other reforms delivered improvements in performance. Unbundling deliver consistently superior results across the board of performance indicators when used as an entry point to implement broader reforms, particularly introducing a sound regulatory framework, reducing the degree of concentration of the generation and distribution segments of the market by attracting additional number of both public and private players and encouraging private sector participation. Partial forms of vertical unbundling do not appear to drive improvements, probably because the owner was able to continue exercising control over the affairs of the sector and hinder the development of competitive pressure within the power market.