Bøker av Peter (University of Maryland) Carruthers

Peter Carruthers challenges the central assumptions of many philosophers on reflective thinking and consciousness. He draws on extensive knowledge of the scientific literature on working memory to argue that non-sensory propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, goals, and decisions) are never conscious, and never under direct intentional control.

Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.

Provides a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. This book is a useful reading for those with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind.