Gjør som tusenvis av andre bokelskere
Abonner på vårt nyhetsbrev og få rabatter og inspirasjon til din neste leseopplevelse.
Ved å abonnere godtar du vår personvernerklæring.Du kan når som helst melde deg av våre nyhetsbrev.
This essay is a sustained argument about how we ought to conceive of a particular word in our political vocabulary given its use in everyday political discussions. There is a sub-category of political concepts called ideal concepts, the most important of which is justice, that have to be the product of a specific method of conception if we are going to have the words available to us that enable us to work towards better political communities. That method is John Rawls' 'realistic Utopia.' In the course of the essay I shall demonstrate the strength of realistic Utopia. I shall begin doing so by explaining what it is, and outlining the qualities that Rawls believes it bestows upon the concepts it produces. In particularly the ¿reconciliatory¿ power that he believes it affords the ideal concept of justice. I then marshal the method through its strongest criticism-the 'concessionary criticism'-which was launched by G.A. Cohen throughout a series of essays1 that culminated in a book length critique of the Rawlsian approach to political philosophy, his 2008 Rescuing Justice and Equality.2 Cohen¿s criticisms can be overcome and Rawls' ideal conception of justice, Justice as Fairness, should not be understood as making the concessions that it is alleged to.
Abonner på vårt nyhetsbrev og få rabatter og inspirasjon til din neste leseopplevelse.
Ved å abonnere godtar du vår personvernerklæring.