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Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute in 2004 this study raises a variety of teaching points that are relevant to today's officer. In addition, the expedition exemplifies the values that have guided the American soldier to the present day. The Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key operation. Part I consists of an expedition overview that establishes the context for the individual actions to be studied in the field. Part II surveys the Army during the early 19th century, detailing the organization, weapons, transportation, logistic support and medical support for the Corps of Discovery. Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit to obtain a concrete view of the expedition in its several phases. For each site, or "stand," there is a set of travel directions, a discussion of the action that occurred there, and vignettes by participants in the expedition that further explain the action and which also allow the student to sense the human drama of the journey into the unknown. Parts IV and V provide information on conducting a staff ride along the Lewis and Clark route, the integration phase, and logistics considerations. Appendix A provides biographical sketches of key expedition members. Appendix B provides a copy of the 'Detachment Orders' written by the officers and NCOs of the corps. Appendix C overviews the uniforms worn by the expedition members, and Appendix D provides copies of the visuals used at the instructional stands. An annotated bibliography suggests sources for further study.

President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon. Received in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957. The JCS activated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), and designated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCS memorandum, These actions marked the beginning of operation 'Blue Bat,' the first United States airborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime. Contents: Doctrine, Planning, Background, Problems, Deployment, Organization, Resupply, Procurement, Civil affairs, Medical support, Security, Plans, Task force 201, On-hand supplies, 31 August 1958. First published 1985.

This Field Manual FM 3-97.6 describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the United States Army uses to fight in mountainous regions. It is directly linked to doctrinal principles found in FM 3-0 and FM 3-100.40 and should be used in conjunction with them. It provides key information and considerations for commanders and staffs regarding how mountains affect personnel, equipment, and operations. It also assists them in planning, preparing, and executing operations, battles, and engagements in a mountainous environment.

First published in 2004, Major Donald Carr's "Into the Unknown: The Logistics Preparation of the Lewis and Clark Expedition" is a valuable study examining the key logistics components and considerations in the planning and execution of the mission. Modern logisticians will find themes in transportation, civilian contracting, indigenous (host nation) support, and others that still resonate today. Major Carr clearly demonstrates that Captains Lewis and Clark, in facing the daunting tasks of the great expedition, rose to the challenges and met them with ingenuity, detailed planning, discipline, leadership, and resolution-hallmarks worthy of reflection by today's junior leaders.

United States Army Center of Military History publication, CMH Pub 70-113-1. United States Army in Iraq and Afghanistan Series. Edited by Jon T. Hoffman. Provides a soldier's-eye view of the Iraq war.

Reviews of this study on leadership include: "Beau Puryear has written a brilliant and insightful account of Marine Corps generalship. He has truly captured the essence of what the Corps values in its senior leaders. It is a humbling honor to be included in this superb work. This is a must-read for all those who want to understand Marine Corps leadership and why it is so respected." - General (Ret.) Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.). "This book is the best treatise on leadership, and all the characteristics that make it up, that I've ever read. It will be a bestseller in the Marine Corps, and beyond that-and will create in our sister Service members who read it an even greater envy that they didn't choose the Marine Corps. By drawing directly from the experiences of those who have led, Beau Puryear has offered the reader page after page of "how tos." I wish I had had access to this book when I was 25 years old. Whatever else I did in my years in the Corps would have been a quantum leap greater because of the lessons culled from leaders a hell of a lot more effective than me." - General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Ret.).

NASA SP 2007-4410. NASA History Series. Recounts the story of the rise of Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) and its eventual demise. Tells of organizational, cultural, and personal confrontation. Organizational skirmishes involved the Space Council versus NASA, the White House versus congressional appropriators, and the Johnson Space Center versus the rest of the space agency--all seeking control of the national space policy process.

Taking advantage of the Soviet archives, which were opened in the 1990s, Siddiqi has written a groundbreaking work that examines why the Soviet Union fell behind in the space race of the 1960s after changing the course of human history with the first artificial satellite launch, Sputnik, in 1957. 1,030 pp.

Originally published in 1964, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1968, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1971, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1970, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1972, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1971, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.

Originally published in 1982, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. Abstract: "Night combat has frequently been the recourse of the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is a double-edged weapon. During World War II, the Soviets effectively exploited darkness in a variety of operations from withdrawal to pursuit. As the war dragged on, the Red Army relied increasingly on night operations and so refined its abilities that it was able to progress from limited tactical missions by relatively small units to front-level operations by armies with complex coordination and control. Today Soviet military writers frequently discuss night operations, as they do all operations, with reference to their experiences in the Second World War. They appear convinced, as one Soviet general and historian has noted, that their troops should be equally capable of operating both during the day and at night and that night operations have an urgent significance in modern warfare". Include photos. maps, tables.

Originally published in 1984, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. On the night of 10-11 July, several thousand Japanese infantrymen attack and broke through U.S. Army covering force units defending the Driniumor River about twenty miles east of Aitape, New Guinea. For the next month U.S. army troops were locked in a battle of attrition with the Japanese, as the Americans fought to restore the breakthrough line and destroy the Japanese attackers. This study describes the events leading up to the Japanese breakthrough and the subsequent American counterattack to restore the original defensive positions. Include photos. maps, tables.

Originally published in 1981. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Brig. Gen Soutchay Vongsavanh, then Commanding General of Military Region 4. The study reviews and analyzes Royal Lao Government military operations in the Laotion panhandle. Special attention is devoted to the significance of the panhandle for enemy military operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the initiation of conventional warfare in southern Laos, lessons learned during the employment of regular and irregular forces and developments following the 1973 cease-fire.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung.

Originally published in 1981. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Lt. Gen . Sak Sutsakhan.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Lt. Gen Dong Van Khuyen.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.