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If you are reading this, you are a chronic concept-user. You have at your disposal a staggering repertoire of concepts, which you use round the clock to great effect. Many of these concepts correspond to mundane categories such as doorknob, Tuesday and pigeon. Other of your concepts are so entangled with things that matter to you that mere mention of them may trigger a cascade of associations and emotions. Consider: Grief. Intimacy. Betrayal. Compassion. Genocide. The concepts you possess are not inert objects that sit like ornaments on some shelf in your mind. They are the very tools which you use to plan; think through problems; navigate and interact with a world of familiar objects, people and events; and to understand and formulate sentences. The measure of good politics, good science, good poetry and, of course, good philosophy, is very often the skilful use of concepts.
Generally speaking, philosophers have avoided discussing the topic of disability. Some believe that issues involving disability are to "be addressed outside the realm of justice, through charity or acts of benevolence" (Riddle and Bickenbach 4). Others believe that disability studies are an ". . . exploration solely for disability advocates or theor ists . . ." (Riddle and Bickenbach 2). Regardless of the reasoning, the consequences are the same: disability, disability studies, and disabled philosophers continue to be left out of philosophical discussions as a whole. However, there have been some phil osophical discussions that gently skirt around the idea of disabled people. In Book One of the disability -whether he intended to or not -Politics , Aristotle implicitly references when he says that "he who is unable to live in society, or who has no ne ed because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god . . ." (Aristotle and Jowett 3). In other words, a person that functions in a way that differs from most of the culture around them must be something other than human. It is completel y impossible, according to Aristotle, that a human behave, look, or think differently than those around them. Therefore, disabled people must be either "a beast or a god." Both ends of this statement are problematic because no matter what, the disabled sub ject is no longer a person. As a god, the disabled subject is incapable of being viewed as a part of human society, and will inevitably fail to live up to the extraordinarily high expectations set -due to the fact that they are not actually a god. As a b east, the disabled subject is still incapable of being a full member of human society, but has no autonomy to create the world in which they want to live.
Saliha, translated, means 'virtuous'. A question becomes timeless not because it lacks an answer, but also because it requires revisiting as contexts change. So, in our ever- changing, post-normal world, the time is ripe to ask: What does it mean to be a good person or to bring out the good in others or society? Whereas 'virtues discourse' largely revolves around ethics dominated by Ancient Greek and modern or contemporary Western thought, this issue seeks a more critical analysis of Islamic and other non-Western virtues. We will explore other, less-often-heard, harder-to- name virtues, fit for the present era.
A high-level insider's account of how China and India are locked in an ongoing struggle for supremacy in Asia.
The fascinating tale of humankind's journey from owning nothing to being owned-by our stuff. Why, when and how did our needs become world-destroying addictions?
An original analysis of narratives of stability in three Gulf states. How has this concept influenced policy-making since the Arab Spring?
Lin is a leading biological researcher. She has received a job offer of $60,000 at a corporation developing anti-balding technology, and a governmental grant offer of $30,000 for her proposal to research solutions to neglected diseases in impoverished areas. To some, there is no obligation from the point of view of social justice to take the government position over the corporate position; in her personal choices, she has complied with and supported just institutions, which is all that is needed. To others, there very well may be a social justice obligation. The issue that this divergence in opinion is about has amassed many names: Cohen calls it what the "eye of justice" focuses on (Rescuing 16), Tan "the site of justice" (Justice 34), and Rawls "the primary subject of justice" (Rawls 3). The issue is important theoretically, with respect to how we categorize what things are a subject of justice, and practically, with respect to how we are obligated in our personal choices.1
Ten years after Libya descended into conflict, the contours of a new society are emerging. How has violence remade the country--what has happened to inter-community and inter-personal relations, to social hierarchies and elite composition? Which new groups, networks and identities have formed through conflict, and how has this transformed power structures, modes of capital accumulation and governance at the local and national levels? How has the violence contributed to create new communities, both inside the country and in exile? This volume brings together leading researchers, both foreign and Libyan, to examine the deep changes undergone by Libya's society amid civil war. These transformations are bound to shape the country for decades to come, and will influence its relations with the outside world. By addressing neglected yet crucial aspects of social change amid violence, the contributors substantially broaden the picture of Libyan society beyond the current confines of scholarship, as well as enriching wider debates in Conflict Studies.
A great many philosophers suggest that we can exercise epistemic agency. Notably, they include Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski, Christine Korsgaard, John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Pamela Hieronymi, Martin Steup, Joseph Raz, Alvin Goldman, and Miranda Fricker.1 Indeed, for a variety of reasons, it is supposedly crucial that we do. For example, the exercise of epistemic agency supposedly enters into the explanation of belief formation and knowledge acquisition; it is said to be necessary for knowledge attribution, rationality, normativity, and responsibility. So what is epistemic agency? Of course, just as there is a plurality of philosophers who maintain that we exercise epistemic agency there is a plurality of ways in which it has been characterized. Nevertheless, we can get a general idea of what it is without getting caught up in the particulars of the accounts
How have decision-makers in Westminster and beyond fanned the flames of national division? Can this disunited kingdom come together once again?
An insight into the myriad competing forces that affect political decision-making in countries as diverse as Iraq, Nepal, Ukraine and Tanzania.
A compelling exploration of Bosniak political identity, chronicling the development of a nation and its people in the wake of catastrophe.
A no-holds-barred account of how German society struggles with its colonial legacy.
An authoritative study of the enduring relevance of tribes in contemporary Iraq and Libya, investigating their complex relationships with state and society.
In this paper I aim to offer a theory of secession. Secession is the process by which some group of people leaves one or more existing states, taking territory with them, in order to form a new state or join another existing state. The main goal of this project is to put forth what I think is the correct approach to the normative question "what are the circumstances under which a group has a moral right to secede?" This is a project that has been addressed by other political philosophers, most notably Alan Buchanan (1991) in his book Secession and Christopher Heath Wellman (2005) in his book A Theory of Secession. They and others have proposed theories of secession, and I aim to explain why my theory, which is that a group has a moral right to secede only if this would be better from a cosmopolitan point of view, might be a better way to think about the question
I became interested in the problem of organization as a participant-observer of the Occupy movement. Those who followed this unexpected course of events will recall that organization was an absolutely central - I would argue the central - axis of strategic debate. On one side were voices from the classical socialist and labor left, along with a new generation of neo-classicists, who argued that the Occupy movement needed to "get organized" to overcome its diffuse and ineffectual character. They convincingly pointed out that without some structure to orient the movement's activities and ensure its continuity, it would simply disintegrate - as it eventually did. On the other side were those who argued for the embrace of spontaneity, conceived as the very opposite of organization, since the latter was always imposed by leaders and hierarchies which would ultimately become obstacles to the realization of the movement's aims. Though their underlying theoretical approach varied widely, from autonomist horizontalism to ultra-left catastrophism, these critics pointed out that the classicists were operating on an ahistorical conception of organization, failing to understand the wide-ranging transformations that separated our present moment from the history of the workers' movement (a history far more contradictory than the various forms of socialist nostalgia imagined)
Are war and inequality inevitable, because evolution made men competitive and dominant? Think again with this entertaining yet powerful new history of 'true' human nature.
How does a girl from a tiny Bangladeshi island end up reading Tagore, Marx and de Beauvoir and become a leading feminist campaigner?
Explains how disciplined advocates of Hindu nationalism have reshaped British society and politics.
What defines evil? An examination of evil through the lens of Islamic Studies
From aristocratic and Nazi legacies to parliamentary parties and new populisms, a renowned journalist explores the forces that have shaped Austria's politics since 1945.
The inspiring, haunting story of Chinese migrant workers rejected by the USA and determined to build a new community in Mexico-told by their great-grandson.
An award-winning journalist courageously reveals the personal cost of war reporting, vividly recalling his dangerous assignment and confronting its devastating impact on his family. After ten years reporting from central Africa, Anjan Sundaram is living a quiet life in Canada with his wife and new-born. But when preparations for genocide emerge in the Central African Republic, he is suddenly torn between his duty to his family, and his moral responsibility to expose the conflict. Soon he is travelling through the CAR, driven by a possible spyâ¿discovering ransacked villages and locals fleeing imminent massacre, fielding offers of mined gold, and hearing of soldiers who steal schoolbooks for cigarette paper. When he refuses to return home, journeying instead into a rebel stronghold, he learns that there is no going back to the life he has left behind. Breakup illuminates the personal price paid by those bearing witness on the frontlines of humanitarian crimes across the globe. This brilliantly introspective, strikingly grounded account of perilous warzones and inner turmoil is sure to become a modern classic.
Shines long-overdue light on the heroic individuals who took action in the face of the Armenian genocide.
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