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The authors used quantitative analysis and case studies of China, Iran, and Russia to examine the causes and likely future trends in proxy wars: civil wars in which at least one local warring party receives material support from an external state.

This report examines changes in behavioral health care delivered to service members by the Military Health System following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, including patterns of care, use of telehealth, and quality of care.

Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism is becoming an increasingly common occurrence in the United States. Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE)-related terrorism has consequences beyond loss of life: It undermines the sense of safety that targeted groups feel in their country and unravels the social fabrics of trust that are necessary for society to function. Further still, REMVE attacks can motivate other like-minded attackers to follow up with their own attacks, as was apparently the case with the May 14, 2022, mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, by a self-avowed, internet-radicalized white supremacist whose manifesto drew heavily from the March 15, 2019, Christchurch mosque mass shootings, which also inspired a mass shooting in El Paso, Texas. Two key challenges for those who observe online spaces in which radicalization occurs are the sheer volume of data and the idiosyncrasies of online communities. Website-specific language and memes are difficult to track and parse; even if emerging terms are detected, defining them can be difficult. RAND Corporation researchers developed the Racist and Violent Extremist Flock (RVE-Flock) tool to explore and analyze textual content on REMVE-affiliated social media. The user can identify emerging terms used in REMVE communities and trends on internet platforms. In this guide, the authors characterize term proliferation in online communities by exploring various REMVE terms and demonstrate the tool's functionality. To conclude, the authors identify additional applications of this work and potential refinements of the tool.

The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) understanding of the military balance is fundamentally based on systems warfare concepts. Systems concepts drive China's perceptions of the successes of its three-decade-old modernization and its identification of enduring or emerging weaknesses. China's leaders recognize the qualitative and quantitative improvements in PLA weapons and technology; however, in key areas essential to conducting systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare, there remain significant gaps that have received the attention of Xi Jinping himself. During Xi's tenure, the PLA has been forced to confront a range of problems that go well beyond technological modernization, force structure, and organizational relationships. Still, both the United States and the PRC, through different evaluation processes, have concluded that war with the other has the potential to be extremely risky from an escalation standpoint, protracted and costly, and fatally harmful to long-term credibility and/or strategic goals. This analysis is one of the first to detail how the PLA understands and assesses military balance. The PLA sees itself as the weaker side in the overall military balance, largely because it has made only limited progress in those key areas that will define future warfare, most importantly informatization and system-of-systems-based operations. Necessary improvements have not materialized quickly and will likely take time because of the PLA's organizational culture and the improvements' systemic complexity. A refined understanding of Beijing's view of the PLA also has significant implications for U.S. policymakers, military commanders, and planners.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operates multiple hazard mitigation assistance (HMA) grant programs as a way to promote a national culture of preparedness and public safety, mitigate the consequences that disasters have for communities and infrastructure, and reduce future draws on the Disaster Relief Fund. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act requires FEMA to ensure that these mitigation activities are cost-effective. To determine cost-effectiveness, FEMA currently requires any project seeking HMA grants to include a benefit-cost analysis (BCA), implemented in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94. Applicants for mitigation grants have provided extensive feedback that the BCA process is cumbersome and that finding the right data to include in the calculations of costs and benefits is difficult. FEMA is concerned that the administrative burdens and the costs of application processes could discourage subapplicants with fewer resources from applying or place them at a disadvantage in developing quality applications. Furthermore, two 2021 executive orders direct federal agencies to achieve greater equity and fairness in allocating federal resources. Two HMA grant programs have been selected as pilot programs for the corresponding federalwide Justice40 Initiative. The authors found that FEMA's dual goals of equity and simplicity occasionally compete, that FEMA has the authority to implement recommended changes, and that FEMA's approach to BCA differs from those of other federal entities. The authors identify nine changes that FEMA could implement to address the inequities introduced by the use of BCA in the HMA grant process.

From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission.

"RAND researchers examine the reasons behind Russia's evolution toward a unified strategic operation, as well as the capabilities that would be necessary to execute key conventional offensive tasks in such an operation"--

"The authors of this report describe a tool designed to help U.S. Department of Defense decisionmakers select from the many available approaches to promote and protect critical technologies and their associated industrial base"--

U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command asked the RAND Corporation to assess the Marine Corps offensive cyber operations acquisition life cycle and identify ways to improve the transparency of related decisionmaking. The authors brought together data on operational capability, scheduling, and risk to develop a life-cycle cost-estimating framework. This framework should help Joint Cyber Weapons (JCW) program leadership understand the potential costs and provide additional guidance on budgeting considerations. It incorporates five classes of inputs and has three types of outputs. In creating the framework, the authors considered the demand for exploits from the operational user, as well as the type of cyber weapon (e.g., exploit, implant, payload), the weapon's target environment (e.g., desktop or mobile systems), vulnerability decay rate, the adversary's defense capabilities, weapon cost, and how various acquisitions are phased in and out of service over time. The framework also addresses the production of cyber weapons, their costs, and how uncertainties are distributed over a specified period. The authors conducted exploratory modeling and simulation to better understand associated uncertainties and model inputs.

Over the past decade, more than 10 billion dollars has been invested in Pittsburgh tech companies, with more than 3.5 billion invested in 2021 alone. With the context of such strong sectoral growth in mind, RAND Corporation researchers set out to characterize the science- and technology-focused (STF) workforce ecosystem in the Pittsburgh region and suggest policy changes and investment opportunities to future-proof the ecosystem. Researchers sought to define STF occupations in a regionally relevant way, characterize the current state of the STF ecosystem, identify barriers and facilitators to participation in the STF ecosystem, and develop strategies to facilitate the STF ecosystem's continued growth. To achieve these goals, the research team used qualitative and quantitative methods. The research team selected Boston and Nashville as peer regions to further contextualize quantitative findings. Researchers found that Pittsburgh has a sizable share of STF employment relative to the United States and to Nashville. However, additional investments and changes to policy can safeguard the region's strengths and support Pittsburgh as a flourishing science and technology hub. Recommendations include improving market conditions to support expansion of the STF workforce; supporting and engaging communities of color and other locally underrepresented groups; building out regionally relevant, data-backed career pathways; and crafting and implementing a regional STF strategy.

Victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment often experience a variety of psychological outcomes and mental health symptoms related to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, substance abuse, suicidal ideation, and self-harm. Sexual trauma also might affect careers. Despite a need to address these harms, some service members have reported that connecting to health care or mental health services following sexual assault or sexual harassment can be difficult-in part because of a lack of leadership support. Given these persistent challenges, the Psychological Health Center of Excellence identified an urgent need to better understand research that is pertinent to sexual assault and sexual harassment during military service so that the U.S. Department of Defense and the military services can improve the health care response for service members. RAND researchers investigated and synthesized relevant research in three topic areas: (1) the effectiveness of psychotherapy treatments designed for adult victims of sexual assault or sexual harassment in military settings; (2) barriers faced by U.S. military members to accessing and remaining in mental health care settings; and (3) associations between sexual assault or sexual harassment and mental health conditions.

"The authors of this report examine what streamlining techniques are being used to accelerate U.S. Space Force acquisition, the risks associated with those techniques, their potential impact on mission assurance, and the possible mitigations"--

Prepared for the Department of the Air Force.

While China's growing economic power began reshaping the global economy in the 2000s and Beijing's foreign policy approach has increasingly sought to reshape the international order since the 2010s, the future role of China's rapidly improving military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), on the global stage remains unclear. However, General Secretary Xi Jinping's 2017 assertion that the PLA will transform into "world-class forces" by 2049 implies that China will seek to develop at least some level of global military power over the next three decades. This study aims to understand where China might seek to gain basing and access for PLA forces abroad and what types of operations it might carry out there. The authors develop a framework to systematically assess valuable attributes from Beijing's perspective, focusing on the utility of potential host nations (desirability) and on China's ability to secure access (feasibility). They evaluate 108 countries across three priority regions-the Middle East, Africa, and the broader Indo-Pacific-and the respective U.S. combatant command areas of responsibility in which each country is located. The authors match 17 framework indicators, focusing on the 2030-2040 time frame, to available quantitative and qualitative data to assess and rank potential host nations. They discuss implications and recommend strategies for the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army to better understand China's plans for additional overseas basing and access and to prioritize risks to U.S. forces.

In this report, the authors look to the past to help anticipate what Chinese overseas access and basing might look like in the 2030s. They focus on three case studies of overseas military access and basing among the United States' competitors -- French bases in francophone Africa during De Gaulle's presidency, Soviet bases ringing the Mediterranean and Red Seas region under Brezhnev, and Russian bases in Syria during the ongoing Syrian civil war -- to understand how major powers have conceived of and used strategic basing in the past. France, the Soviet Union, and Russia -- together with the United States (also examined) -- have had the largest networks of overseas military bases in the post-World War II period. These cases represent a range of competitive behaviors, reflecting the uncertainty of Chinese behavior ten to 20 years in the future. Drawing on a combined examination of case studies and a literature review of U.S. basing experiences, the authors assess the potential risks posed by Chinese military expansion and recommend principles for the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Army to adopt now to help shape the environment in which Chinese ambitions for global military presence will unfold.

A detailed enumeration of activities, a synthesis of expert consensus on challenges to gray zone competition, and a dynamic menu of solutions can enhance the U.S. competitive position in the gray zone and beyond.

The purpose of this report is to assist Department of Defense decisionmakers called upon to respond to adverse economic shocks by identifying opportunities for improving analysis of shocks and their effects on U.S. defense postures.

The authors analyze how statutes, personnel policies, and resource policies constrain how Air Reserve Component personnel are utilized to perform frequent or long-term active component operational requirements.

In this report, RAND researchers present practical knowledge to inform law enforcement agencies about available broadband options and opportunities, governance issues, funding options, costs, and barriers to implementation.

Section 1652 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) tasks the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to perform a zero-based review (ZBR)-a detailed review rather than a simple comparison with previous size or budget-of its cybersecurity and information technology (IT) workforces. DoD engaged the RAND National Defense Research Institute to produce a process for validating and ensuring the consistency of data and analysis used for its ZBR. The authors organize the NDAA requirements into five themes: current workforce, current work performed, manning and capability gaps, potential barriers to efficiency and effectiveness, and potential future changes in work performed or requirements. Organizations across the four DoD services-the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy-plus the Defense Information Systems Agency were selected to participate in the DoD cyber ZBR. Collectively, the participating organizations reported a total of almost 18,000 cybersecurity and IT personnel, 84 percent of whom are civilians and 16 percent of whom are military personnel. The authors use quantitative and qualitative research methods to analyze multiple data sources, such as DoD workforce data, subject-matter expert interviews with organizational leadership, a work analysis data call, a comparison of DoD and private sector cyber workforces, and a sample of cybersecurity and IT position descriptions. They present key findings, aggregated across the participating organizations and arranged by theme. The ZBR process described in this report constitutes a transparent, repeatable process with which DoD can conduct ZBRs across the DoD cyber enterprise.

This report, which provides a narrative account of four battles within Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and a review of U.S. ground force contributions to those battles, is intended to serve as an operational history and review of warfighting functions as applied to OIR. Although OIR was both a Coalition fight and joint one, the report's focus on U.S. ground forces is meant to address gaps both in analysis and in the common understanding of OIR. This research was structured according to the operational concept of by, with, and through. This concept refers to the U.S. military's reliance on local partners-either a host nation government or a local surrogate force-to prosecute ground fighting with U.S. support. That support typically encompasses U.S. advising and enablers and could involve U.S. forces accompanying the partner. Although the terminology is familiar to those working in national security, it has yet to be formalized in joint doctrine and there are inconsistencies in its usage. The authors trace the development of the concept and its application in OIR, then analyze how it might be better incorporated into military doctrine. The authors detail four battles: the counterattacks on Ramadi and on Fallujah, setting the conditions for Mosul, and the urban fight in Mosul. The choice of these operations was made to ensure treatment of the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys where the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was defeated in Iraq and to cover battles at different points in the overall campaign.

This report offers a new framing of U.S. national security interests in the Middle East in light of changed political, security, and economic contexts. The authors argue for a new approach to managing U.S. security interests in the region that avoids the pattern of recurring reactive military engagements that have drawn in the United States for decades. This approach recognizes that the Middle East sits at the crossroads of multiple vital U.S. interests and that problems that start in the Middle East spread worldwide. The authors contend that the United States should not deprioritize or disengage from the Middle East but should instead manage the full range of its interests there. These include the traditional goals of preventing terrorism, protecting global energy markets, and dealing with Iranian nuclear proliferation and other malign activities, as well as additional interests related to addressing great power competition, regional conflicts, the human and financial costs of conflict, civilian displacement, climate change, the well-being of allies, and chronic instability. To safeguard its interests, the United States should rely less on military operations and more on diplomacy, economic development, and technical assistance. A reshaped U.S. strategy that both maintains the Middle East as a priority and rebalances military and civilian tools can help steer the region from one where costs to the United States prevail to one where benefits to the American people-as well as people in the Middle East-accrue. Completed before Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the report has not been revised subsequently.

In this report, researchers describe fifth-generation (5G) security and identify where the United States has security advantages or disadvantages relative to China in the 5G competition and how to preserve those advantages.

Information and information technologies infuse all parts of modern society-in peacetime, during periods of strategic competition, and during wartime. Since the early 2000s, advanced information technologies for rapidly sharing, processing, and analyzing data have had a significant effect on the character of Russian military operations. An examination of the Russian military-scientific literature reveals the centrality of the concept of information confrontation in Russian military strategy. Information confrontation, or informatsionnoe protivoborstvo (IPb), is a distinct element of Russian strategic thinking in the post-Cold War era. Russia sees itself as being in a constant state of information confrontation with the West as it tries to expand its own dominance and prevent its adversaries from gaining influence. In this report, the authors examine prevailing definitions and types of information confrontation, and they discuss the historical evolution of Russian (and Soviet) influence operations and psychological warfare, from 18th-century Imperial Russia up to the Vladimir Putin era. As a fundamental element of Russian strategy, information confrontation is evolving from something primarily carried out to supplement traditional means of waging war into something that is carried out continuously and in peacetime to shape the operational environment so that it will be malleable in future conflicts. The authors also analyze the experience of Ukraine, which has been the subject of one of Russia's most comprehensive IPb and hybrid warfare campaigns in recent years. Ukraine offers a window into the present-day role of IPb and Russian activities and intentions in the information domain.