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A treatment on an extended scale of Dryden's non-dramatic verse, with attention to the celebrator, the satirist, the journalist, the singer, and the story-teller. Van Doren's 1920 "effort to brighten the most neglected side of the greatest neglected English poet" remains a foundation stone in Dryden biography and criticism and presented the definitive statement of Dryden's reputation at the time. This title is cited and recommended by the Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature and Books for College Libraries.

Operation End Sweep: A History of Minesweeping Operations in North Vietnam was written in 1977 by staff members of Tensor Industries of Fairfax, Virginia. Tensor prepared this account under the terms of a contract with the Mine Warfare Project Office of the Naval Sea Systems Command which, in turn, responded to a requirement from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Since the study was a security-classified document, it originally saw limited circulation. Tensor's preface pointed out the importante of End Sweep. That operation represented the U.S. Navy's first major minesweeping campaign since the Navy faced the challenge, in 1950-1951, of clearing extensive enemy minefields laid at Wonsan, Korea. The helicopter mine countermeasures systems developed after the Navy's experience in Wonsan saw their first extensive use in End Sweep. Finally, Tensor's authors noted the special problems posed by the shallow depths of North Vietnam's coastal waters and the sensitivity of the mines involved. Ironically, the U.S. Navy originally laid the mines swept by American naval forces off North Vietnam. The Seventh Fleet's 1972 mine offensive severely hampered Hanoi's ability to import war supplies from abroad and was a factor in encouraging Hanoi to negotiate a peace accord with the United States. The mines posed an equal threat to seaborne commerce once America withdrew from Southeast Asia. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the talks leading up to the Paris cease-fire agreement of January 1973, Hanoi demanded that the United States enter into a separate diplomatic protocol in which America agreed to "render harmless" the mines we had laid in the waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Over the next six months, as the U.S. Mine Countermeasures Force accomplished this work, and American forces withdrew from Southeast Asia, Hanoi continued to wage war against South Vietnam. During that period the United States viewed the minesweeping operation as a means of attempting to influence North Vietnam's behavior. Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Head of the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch and a well-known historian of the naval war in Southeast Asia, skillfully revised this document for publication and composed an introduction that places these events in historical perspective. I also wish to acknowledge the major contributions made by Sandra J. Doyle, the Center's Senior Editor, in copy editing the study and overseeing its printing. Operation End Sweep describes a classic mine clearance campaign involving the deployment of men, ships, and specialized equipment halfway around the globe to complete a demanding and politically sensitive naval operation. Considering the continuing importance of mine warfare, the Navy's historians publish this account in the hope that it will be of special interest to today's naval professionals.Dean C. AllardDirector of Naval History

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface.We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

CONTENTSIntroductionAncient Conceptions Concerning the Motions of the Sun, Moon, Planets and StarsThe Geometry of Planetary Motions from Copernicus to KeplerThe Discovery of the Law of GravitationThe Attraction of Material Bodies of Different ShapesExperimental Detection of Attraction between Material Bodies on EarthNewton's Law---The Theoretical Basis of Celestial MotionCelestial Motion and the Two-Body ProblemThe Concept of Perturbed Motion. Celestial Mechanics and Practical AstronomyWays of Describing Perturbed Motion. The Variational OrbitThe Problem of Motion in the Solar SystemSuccessive Approximations in the Theory of Motion of Heavenly BodiesThe Discovery of NeptunePeriodic and Secular PerturbationsNumerical Methods in Celestial MechanicsSatellite TheoryArtificial Earth Satellites and Their MotionThe Motions of AsteroidsPlanetary RotationProblems of Qualitative Celestial MechanicsStellar Motions and the Law of GravitationWhat is Gravitation?Appendix

Mao Tse-tung counseled, "To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds." Few concepts mesh so contextually with Mao than the Chinese approach to Information Warfare (IW). As the People's Republic of China struggles with its national military strategy, IW offers opportunities to win wars without the traditional clash of arms. In this monograph, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara explores what he perceives to be China's pursuit of IW as a method of fighting asymmetric warfare against the United States. Largely imitative of U.S. thoughts, literature, and practices on IW, he believes the Chinese are seeking ways to adapt it to their own style of warfare. Paradoxically, he observes that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW in practice. The Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict have provided ample largess to the Chinese archives. Mr. Yoshihara examines those aspects of IW-PSYOPS, Denial, and Deception-that China believes provides the greatest prospects for victory in a conflict. Not surprisingly, Sun Tzu is interwoven into this emerging theory. Targeting the enemy's "nervous system" at all levels, that is, his ability to gather and assess information and then transmit orders, provides significant advantages in the prosecution of a campaign. Targeting the enemy's homeland defenses and its citizens can potentially end a war before it even starts. He concludes that the extent of Chinese advances or intent regarding IW is difficult to ascertain given its closed society. Chinese IW may still be nascent, but the menacing intent is there and only vigilance will protect the United States. Much in the realm of IW remains speculative and conceptual. Aspiring nations can take advantage of the Revolution in Military Affairs by skipping generations of technology and becoming a modern, sophisticated threat, obviating the need for significant financial investments. The consequences of the threat are of great import to today's strategic leaders and thinkers. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate that will continue into the millennium.Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CONTENTSForewordIntroductionFoundations of Strategic ModernizationChina's Quest for Information DominanceDawn of a New Age: China's Long-Range Precision Strike CapabilitiesIn Defense of its Own: China's Aerospace DefenseConclusionAppendix I. China Aerospace Corporation OrganizationAppendix II. The Legend of Qian XuesenAppendix III. Space Support for Strategic ModernizationAppendix IV. China's Directed Energy WeaponsAppendix V. Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National DefenseAppendix VI. China's Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI)About the Author

The global war on terrorism has provided a new context for relations between the United States and China. As the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America makes clear, cooperation with China on a range of economic, political, security, and military issues increasingly serves U. S. interests. At the same time, this relationship retains elements of competition and the potential for confrontation, compounded by a legacy of periodic crises and mutual wariness. Achieving a national consensus on an appropriate balance in U.S.-China relations, especially in military-to-military affairs, remains a central challenge for those who analyze, formulate, and implement America's China policies. The distinguished contributors to this volume offer fresh and sometimes divergent assessments of major trends in Chinese society, national security policy, and military affairs as the "fourth generation" of national leaders settles into the seats of power. The essays examine leadership shifts under way in the People's Liberation Army and how the Chinese armed forces are coping with dramatic changes in economic and social life, the Chinese Communist Party's search for relevance, developments in the global security environment, and the revolution in military affairs. Also explored are trends in civil-military relations, growing Chinese nationalism, evolving PLA military capabilities, Beijing's approach to key regional and global issues, the prospects for U.S.-China relations and military-to-military cooperation, and the implications of these developments for U. S. defense planning. The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition provides insights into critical issues that will impact China, the Asia-Pacific region, and world, and advances balanced assessments of U. S. policy options. I trust readers will find that it makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing national debate. Paul G. Gaffney II Vice Admiral, USN President

"Make room for Colonel Crockett!" said the usher at the White House, one evening, when the famous Congressman from the backwoods presented himself with a number of other callers. "Colonel Crockett makes room for himself!" was the exclamation of the Member as he strode into the room. The incident is typical of the man. Gifted by nature with an exhaustless fund of humor, born to privation, hardship and labor, trained, not in the school of books, but in the severer one of experience, he exhibited true manliness, honesty and bravery in all his words and actions. Colonel Crockett lacked the refinements which a truer education would have given him: he said and did things which cannot be held up as models for the youth of to-day ; but a profound sense of justice and of devotion to right permeated his entire life. Rough and uncultured though he was, his career contains much that is commendable and worthy of imitation. His moral heroism was displayed in his defiance of the vast powers of President Jackson when political ruin was the almost inevitable consequence. Of no man can it more truly be said that he preferred being right to being President. His personal daring was shown on many a battle-field; in the dim woods, when, singlehanded, he encountered the savage bear; in the swamps, when struggling against malaria, starvation, and the wily Creek warrior; when coursing on his mustang over the Texan prairie and pursued by the fierce Comanche; and when, day after day and night after night, he loaded and fired his deadly rifle from within the sulphurous walls of the Alamo, while Santa Anna and his hosts closed about him and his fellow-patriots in a circle of flame and fire, and when, panting, begrimed and bloody, he stood with the handful of survivors until he saw, like a lightning-flash, the treachery of the Mexican dictator, and, making a last desperate rush, with his drawn bowie-knife, he perished when within a pace of the traitor. Not a defender lived to tell the story of the sublime defence of the Alamo. Neither ancient nor modern history affords a grander exhibition of heroism than was shown on that crimson day when the blood of the Spartan band became the seed from which sprang Texan independence. Who has ever stood with bared head, and read without a quicker heart-throb, those words chiseled in the cenotaph in the Texan capital, and since destroyed by fire ?-"THERMOPYLÆ HAD ITS MESSENGER OF DEFEAT: THE ALAMO HAD NONE !"

General Adams reflects on his experiences in the cold war, during which he served in both manned bombers and missile silos. He tells stories of famous and not-so-famous cold warriors, including some from the US Navy. Some stories are humorous; some stories are tragic. Having traveled extensively in Russia and some former Soviet Union states after retirement, General Adams tells us about his former adversaries, the Soviet cold warriors. In the process, he leaves no doubt about his respect for all who served so valiantly in the "strategic triad"-- the strategic command, the ICBM force, and the submarine Navy.