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This book gives a unique personal glimpse of modern Chinese history from the beginning of the century to the "Cultural Revolution" through the eyes of one of the builders of the Chinese Red Army. Born into a poor peasant family in Hunan Province, Marshal Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) enlisted in 1916 in one of the old warlords' armies. While rising through the ranks to become a regimental commander, Peng Dehuai worked underground to organize soldiers' rights groups. He joined the Communist Party shortly before leading the Pingjiang Uprising in 1928 against reactionary rule. After founding the Third Army of the Chinese Red Army, Peng Dehuai went on to a brilliant career as an eminent commander before and during the epic Long March, in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, and in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. After Liberation in 1949, he senred as Vice-Premier of the State Council and Minister of Defence. Marshal Peng Dehuai fell into political disgrace in 1959 after addressing a letter to Chairman Mao Zedong pointing out some of the problems in the "Great Leap Forward". Under virtual house arrest for most of the last 16 years of his life, Marshal Peng did manual labour and wrote biographical notes in response to demands for "confessions". He died under persecution during the "Cultural Revolution" on November 29, 1974. Exonerated by the CPC Central Committee in 1978, Marshal Peng Dehuai has been restored to his rightful place in history as one of the greatest military leaders in China's revolution.

This volume examines the least known of the major units in the European theater, General Jacob L. Devers' 6th Army Group. Under General Devers' leadership, two armies, the U.S. Seventh Army under General Alexander M. Patch and the First French Army led by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, landing on the Mediterranean coast near Marseille in August 1944, cleared the enemy out of southern France and then turned east and joined with army groups under Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Omar N. Bradley in the final assault on Germany. In detailing the campaign of these Riviera-based armies, the authors have concentrated on the operational level of war, paying special attention to the problems of joint, combined, and special operations and to the significant roles of logistics, intelligence, and personnel policies in these endeavors. They have also examined in detail deception efforts at the tactical and operational levels, deep battle penetrations, river-crossing efforts, combat in built-up areas, and tactical innovations at the combined arms level. Such concepts are of course very familiar to today's military students, and the fact that this volume examines them in such detail makes this study especially valuable to younger officers and noncommissioned officers. In truth, the challenges faced by military commanders half a century ago were hardly unique. That is why I particularly urge today's military students, who might well face some of these same problems in future combat, to study this campaign so that they might learn from their illustrious predecessors in the profession of arms.

This manual provides criteria and guidance for the design of structures to resist the effects of earthquakes. It takes a general approach for the seismic design of buildings, including architectural components, mechanical and electrical equipment supports, some structures other than buildings, and utility systems. Primary emphasis is given to the equivalent static force design procedure.

This manual was prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and provides technical criteria and guidance for the planning, design, and construction of tunnels and shafts in rock for civil works projects. Specific areas covered include geological and geotechnical explorations required, construction of tunnels and shafts, design considerations, geomechanical analysis, design of linings, and instrumentation and monitoring. The manual emphasizes design, construction and an understanding of the methods, and conditions of construction essential to the preparation of good designs.

A bold, unconventional use of American air power to support British ground troops in Burma, Operation THURSDAY marked a critical development in the history of modern warfare. On March 5-6, 1944, the Allies conducted an air invasion of Burma, in an attempt to push back the Japanese in the China-Burma-India Theater and reestablish the land route between India and China. U.S. airmen formed a special operations unit -the 1st Air Commando Group- to transport troops to jungle locations and resupply them, often in the line of fire. The remarkable success of this operation lives on, fifty years later, among the elite 1st Air Commando Group-a force committed to meeting the challenge of unconventional warfare any time, any place, anywhere.

It is commonplace within and outside the intelligence community to acknowledge the predominant role of technology in the collection, dissemination, and even analysis of information. Whit roots traceable to events in the late 1800s, this technological phenomenon loomed ever larger in the twentieth century. The increasing reliance on photographic, signals, and electronic intelligence has been viewed with varying degrees of celebration and concern by scholars and intelligence professionals. This volume contains the essays and commentaries originally presented at the Thirteenth Military Symposium held to address this topic at the United States Air Force Academy from October 12 to 14, 1998. The Participants in the conference attempted to provide a preliminary evaluation of the transformations that have occurred within the military intelligence community as a consequence of the Second World War. Not only did that conflict accelerate advances in technical means of collection, it also led to an international willingness to share intelligence on an unprecedented scale. The years 1939-1945 therefore witnessed a true "revolution" in intelligence collection and cooperation. That war also caused an interrelated growth in organizational size, efficiency, and sophistication that helped gain the craft of intelligence an acceptance in operational circles that it had not previously enjoyed.

Approximately 23.3 million operations were performed in 1989 in the United States, and most of these involved some form of pain management. Unfortunately, clinical surveys continue to indicate that routine orders for intramuscular injections of opioid "as needed"-the standard practice in many clinical settings-fail to relieve pain in about half of postoperative patients. Postoperative pain contributes to patient discomfort, longer recovery periods, and greater use of scarce health care resources and may compromise patient outcomes. There is wide variation in the methods used to manage postoperative and other acute pain, ranging from no set strategy to a comprehensive team approach as advocated in this clinical practice guideline. This guideline sets forth procedures to minimize the incidence and severity of acute pain after surgical and medical procedures and pain associated with trauma in adults and children. It offers clinicians a coherent yet flexible approach to pain assessment and management for use in daily practice. Although it is not practical or desirable to eliminate all postoperative and other acute pain, an aggressive approach to pain assessment and management can reduce such pain, increase patient comfort and satisfaction, and in some cases, contribute to improved patient outcomes and shorter hospital stays. This clinical practice guideline was developed under the sponsorship of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. To develop the guideline, AHCPR convened an interdisciplinary expert panel made up of physicians, nurses, a pharmacist, a psychologist, a physical therapist, a patient/consumer, and an ethicist. The panel first undertook an extensive and interdisciplinary clinical review of current needs, therapeutic practices and principles, and emerging technologies for pain assessment and management. Second, the panel conducted a comprehensive review of the field to define the existing knowledge base and critically evaluate the assumptions and common wisdom in the field. Third, the panel initiated peer review of guideline drafts and field review with intended users in clinical sites. Comments from these reviews were assessed and used in developing the guideline.

The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force offers a vivid, candid, and highly personal account of military life by four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. Their recollections, captured in a 1989 interview at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., cover a period of over thirty years-from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, held by only ten individuals since its establishment in 1966, has given all enlisted service members a representative with direct access to and the ability to advise the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. It has also imparted to each of the interviewees broad and insightful perspectives on the issues discussed. Their careers and the experiences that shaped them reveal that throughout its brief but eventful history the U.S. Air Force has been able to rely completely on the competence, dedication, and absolute professionalism of its enlisted force. This force has proved again and again up to the host of challenges that have confronted it at home and around the globe-tirelessly maintaining the aircraft and supporting the air crews in War II, Korea, and Vietnam, integrating the ranks and welcoming women as equals into the workplace, obtaining a better quality of life for themselves and their families, and pursuing increasingly demanding education and training programs in fast-changing social and technological service milieus. The stories of the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force point to an essential fact-that the service would be unable to carry out its missions successfully in a dangerous world without the genuine cooperation of a motivated enlisted corps. That the Air Force almost flawlessly achieved its objectives in Operation DESERT STORM is in no small measure the result of that corps' tradition of striving and excellence.Richard P. HallionAir Force Historian

This survey by the Library of Congress collects a broad range of information detailing the enormous costs-in human and material resources-incurred as a result of the war in Indochina. The compilation of this information will, I hope, serve to bring into perspective and to clarify the stark implications of United States policy toward this region. The casualty and refugee figures are sadly familiar from the daily newspapers. However, many of the other items also illustrate the profound effect of the war and may not have received the attention they deserve. For example, it is estimated that chemical herbicides have been applied to nearly one-seventh of South Vietnam (6 pounds per person), thereby destroying enough food for 600,000 people for 1 year and enough timber to meet the needs of the country, based on current demand, for 31 years. In South Vietnam agricultural productivity has been lowered; inflation is rampant (Saigon's retail prices having increased by over 700 percent since 1965); and last year the balance, if it can be called that, of trade showed approximately $600 million of imports versus exports of only $12 million. Nevertheless, although this report documents many of the measurable consequences of the war, it cannot reveal the intangible costs which in the long run may be of far greater significance. The survey spells out the casualty figures-827,000 U.S., South Vietnamese, and allied military personnel, over a million civilian casualties in South Vietnam, and countless thousands in Laos and Cambodia, and it is estimated that a third of the population of South Vietnam have become refugees in the course of the past 7 years. But those figures merely hint at the vast destruction of the social fabric and economies of Indochina wrought as a consequence of this tragic war. There is no way of measuring the true cost of a shattered social structure, lost opportunities for development, persistent inflation, black marketeering, corruption, and prostitution. The survey recalls our attention to the 296,000 wounded Americans, but it cannot document the psychological effects of war on the two million who have returned physically intact. Nor can it quantify the effects of this experience on U.S. society-not only the direct economic costs realized through our own inflation, high interest rates and balance-of-payments deficits, but also the intangible costs in terms of erosion of respect for the law, further disruption of the constitutional system of checks and balances, increased distrust of Government, and the growing use of violence as a political tool. These indirect and intangible consequences of the war will have an enduring effect on our future. It is ironic that the war which started, ostensibly, as one to defend freedom and democracy in South Vietnam may have the effect instead of seriously undermining democracy in the United States. In retrospect it is tragically clear that the almost $200 billion estimated by this study to be the cost of the war accrued so far would have been better devoted to solving the problems of our own society, rather than in pursuit of a futile military adventure which has served only to exacerbate them.J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman.

World War II remains the defining experience for the U.S. Army in the twentieth century. It has had a lasting impact on the nation and its place in the world and on the Army and the way it organizes and fights. Although historians have written numerous volumes concerning this global conflict, some gap in the literature remain. In particular, the subject of an American field army headquarters and its organization and role have attracted little attention. Studies on the personalities and styles of individual commanders exist, but the command posts themselves-the ways in they were structures and operated and the functions they performed-have not been much explored. With A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945, the Center of Military History attempts to redress this shortcoming. This study addresses the First Army headquarters in the European theater from its activation in October 1943 to V-E Day in May 1945. Under Generals Omar N. Bradley and Courtney H. Hodges, the First Army headquarters oversaw the American landings on D-Day, the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, the battle of Hürtgen Forest along the German frontier, the defense of the northern shoulder during the Battle of the Bulge, and the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen prior to the final American drive into central Germany. In examining the First Army headquarters' role, this volume shows the army headquarters of World War II as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. The commander and staff faced the problem of coordination with Allied counterparts as well as with headquarters and units from other services. Inadequate information and the limitations of technology added to their challenges. The human dimension was always important, and at times critical, in affecting the work of the headquarters under the stresses of a difficult campaign against an obstinate and resourceful foe. Although times have changed and the modern Army focuses more on regional conflicts and contingencies than on global warfare, we can still learn much from the experience of the First Army headquarters. The Gulf War reemphasized the role of an army headquarters in a theater of operations as a pertinent issue for today's military professional. By examining the experience of soldiers in past conflicts we gain the deeper perspectives and understandings necessary to meet the challenges facing the Army today and in the future.Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN21 June 2000 Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History

The author of this unusual work was one of the most enigmatic, eccentric of English writers. He lived and died in poverty, and was as unscrupulous in grasping for money as were the Borgias he wrote about in their grasping for power. He spent his adult life eluding bill collectors and landlords, begging money from friends or strangers, composing fanatically belligerent notes to publishers demanding funds they had allegedly promised him, and extorting money from hapless benefactors whose faith in him proved most often to be unfounded. Nevertheless, he produced several books of superior quality which are sui generis in their vitality, color, and individuality. The present work is an example. It is by no means a work of objective, rigorously documented scholarship; it teems with Corvo's personal hypotheses, prejudices, and grudges. It steadfastly examines every accusation that has ever been made against the Borgias. Yet it conjures up a picture of Renaissance Italy which may not be historically accurate in every detail, but which vibrates with the spirit of the age. The book is broad in scope, relating to the movements of the Borgia Family during the whole of its career as the ruling house of Italy. In a style that is by turn lyric, dramatic, humorous, sonorous and epigrammatic, Corvo traces the lives of Alonso Borgia (who became Pope Calixtus III), Roderigo Borgia (later Pope Alexander VI), the redoubtable Cesare Borgia and his heralded sister Lucrezia, and other lesser known but equally interesting figures of the Borgia clan. The narrative is spiced with illuminating anecdotes, curious lore, and little-known sidelights in connection with the people and events of that incomparable era. Some of the most absorbing passages are those in which Corvo interrupts the narrative to reflect on such matters as calumny (all charges against the Borgias come under this heading), the loneliness of the popes, the classic learning of the Renaissance, the superiority of the 16th-century methods and mores to 20th-century ones, and many other subjects he feels constrained to remark upon. Perhaps the most engrossing chapter of all is the one which examines the matter of poisoning in the light of the superstitions that were still alive during the Borgia era.

The book was written for anyone interested in the subject. It should be specially helpful to designers and builders of ships, marine engineers, operators, shippers, managers, government officials, lawyers, and underwriters. It will also appeal to others, including nuclear scientists and engineers, scientists and engineers in other fields, teachers, students, and writers. The first two chapters furnish orientation on the subject of nuclear ships, and the third provides technical background for readers with no background in nuclear science. Logically, the longest chapter in the book (Chap. 4) is devoted to the Savannah herself. Several succeeding chapters cover precautions taken in design, construction, and operation to ensure safety. In this aspect of the ship development, the history of nuclear central-station plants seems to be repeating itself: in unknown areas it is better to take many precautions that later will be found unnecessary than to run the risk of not taking the one safety measure that might prove essential. Fueling nuclear ships, very different from taking on fuel oil, is covered in Chap. 7, and the extensive training of the crew in nuclear technology and reactor operation is described in Chap. 8. Concluding chapters cover international aspects of nuclear merchant-ship propulsion such as handling in other ports, safety standards, and insurance; the suitability of different reactors; and economics. The last two chapters are devoted to nuclear tanker design, since it appears that the first economic application may be for large tankers operating long distances, and to nuclear ship activities elsewhere in the world including the Russian icebreaker Lenin.

Part 1 comprises the matter recorded in the field by Jeremiah Curtin in 1883, 1886, and 1887 on the Cattaraugus reservation, near Versailles, New York, including tales, legends and myths. This work of Mr. Curtin represents in part the results of the first serious attempt to record with satisfactory fullness the folklore of the Seneca. The material consists largely of narratives or tales of fiction-naive productions of the story-teller's art which can lay no claim to be called myths, although undoubtedly they contain many things that characterize myths-narratives of the power and deeds of one or more of the personified active forces or powers immanent in and expressed by phenomena or processes of nature in human guise or in that of birds or beasts. Part 2 also consists of Seneca legends and myths, which are translations made expressly for this work from native texts recorded by J. N. B. Hewitt in the autumn of 1896.