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From October 1864 to November 1865, the officers of the CSS Shenandoah carried the Confederacy and the conflict of the Civil War around the globe through extreme weather, alien surroundings, and the people they encountered. Her officers were the descendants of Deep South plantation aristocracy and Old Dominion first families: a nephew of Robert E. Lee, a grandnephew of founder George Mason, and descendants of one of George Washington's generals and of an aid to Washington. One was even an uncle of a young Theodore Roosevelt and another was son-in-law to Raphael Semmes. Shenandoah's mission-commerce raiding (guerre de course)-was a central component of U.S. naval and maritime heritage, a profitable business, and a watery form of guerrilla warfare. These Americans stood in defense of their country as they understood it, pursuing a difficult and dangerous mission in which they succeeded spectacularly after it no longer mattered. This is a biography of a ship and a cruise, and a microcosm of the Confederate-American experience.

The radically new homeland security, military, and legal strategies developed by the United States in the months following the terrorists attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are given comprehensive treatment in this book by a former senior Pentagon official, combat veteran, and criminal prosecutor. Stephen M. Duncan draws on a lifetime of military and legal experience to examine the many questions relating to the role of the armed forces in homeland security, including elements of constitutional and criminal law, foreign policy, tradition and custom, federal-state and inter-agency relations, and politics, as well as military strategy and operations. Among the diverse subjects the author discusses are military tribunals and the International Criminal Court, the statute governing the use of military personnel in law enforcement, defense transformation, the constitutional power of the president, and the reorganization of the government to meet the terrorist threat. Duncan also discusses the strategy and tactics used in Afghanistan and Iraq and critically evaluates the nation's political leadership before and after the 9/11 attacks. His book gives readers access to a wealth of information essential to an understanding of the full picture and at the same time puts them in the midst of policy debates to grasp the immediacy of the situation. This important and absorbing historical narrative will attract general readers as well as those with experience in national security issues, politics, and the law.

The second edition of Sea Power presents a complete history of the world's navies from antiquity to the present. From the opening chapter on galley warfare, through a section on Japanese naval history, to the rise and decline of the British navy and the rise and temporary decline of the American navy, readers will find a broad and colorful tapestry woven by respected naval historians.The book focuses on the influences of sea power upon history as well as on naval operations - strategy, tactics, and logistics. It gives due consideration to changes in naval weapons and the administrative reforms brought about because of them. Sea Power is a lively history in which the personalities that shaped events stand out as sharply as the events themselves.

The Neptune Factor is the biography of an idea-the concept of "Sea Power,"¿a term first coined by Capt. A.T. Mahan and the core thread of his life's work. His central argument was that the outcome of rivalries on the seas have decisively shaped the course of modern history. Although Mahan's scholarship has long been seen as foundational to all systematic study of naval power, Neptune Factor is the first attempt to explain how Mahan's definition of sea power shifted over time.Far from presenting sea power in terms of combat, as often thought, Mahan conceptualized it in terms of economics. Proceeding from the conviction that international trade carried across the world's oceans was the single greatest driver of national wealth (and thus power) in history, Mahan explained sea power in terms of regulating access to 'the common' and influencing the flows of trans-oceanic trade. A nation possessing sea power could not only safeguard its own trade and that of its allies but might also endeavor to deny access to the common to its enemies and competitors.A pioneering student of what is now referred to as the first era of globalization, lasting from the late nineteenth century until the First World War, Mahan also identified the growing dependence of national economies upon uninterrupted access to an interconnected global trading system. Put simply, access to 'the common' was essential to the economic and political stability of advanced societies. This growing dependence, Mahan thought, increased rather than decreased the potency of sea power.Understanding the critical relationship between navies and international economics is not the only reason why Mahan's ideas remain-or rather have once again become-so important. He wrote in, and of, a multi-polar world, when the reigning hegemon faced new challenges, and confusion and uncertainty reigned as the result of rapid technological change and profound social upheaval. Mahan believed that the U.S. Navy owed the American people a compelling explanation of why it deserved their support-and their money. His extensive, deeply informed, and highly sophisticated body of work on sea power constituted his attempt to supply such an explanation. Mahan remains as relevant-and needed-today as he was more than a century ago.

In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China's turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China's potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China's maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China's history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China's current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China's past as it relates to threats to the country's internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.

Justice at the Margins of War fills two important gaps in the literature on the ethics of national security affairs. First, while thinking about the justice of warfare is highly developed, justifications of intelligence activities--which can involve lying, manipulation, coercion, stealing and even killing to obtain and defend information--are relatively limited and often conflicting. The authors explore relevant ethical principles and then apply them to specific activities--including agent recruitment, human and technical methods of espionage and counterintelligence, interrogational torture, analysis, covert action, sabotage, and assassination. Second, ethical work on interstate conflict occurring in a "gray zone" between war and peace has only just begun. Gray zone operations--the use of low-level lethal and sublethal means to weaken others--are not new. But technological developments have increased the forms, intensity, and significance of this realm of competition. This volume defines the gray zone and discusses moral challenges associated with various operations--including lethal, economic, information, election, legal, and cyber.

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a “great maritime power“ and secondly, that the PLA “become a world-class armed force by 2050.“ He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the “world class“ goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's “sea lane anxiety“ and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a “near seas“-focused navy to one that has global reach; a “blue water navy.“ He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to “blue water“ status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's “first responders“ in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines “world class“ but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a “world-class navy“ might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Award-winning author Edward S. Miller contends in this work that the United States forced Japan into international bankruptcy to deter its aggression. While researching newly declassified records of the Treasury and Federal Reserve, Miller, a retired chief financial executive of a Fortune 500 resources corporation, uncovered just how much money mattered. Washington experts confidently predicted that the war in China would bankrupt Japan, not knowing that the Japanese government had a huge cache of dollars fraudulently hidden in New York. Once discovered, Japan scrambled to extract the money. But, Miller explains, in July 1941 President Roosevelt invoked a long-forgotten clause of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to freeze Japan's dollars and forbade it to sell its hoard of gold to the U.S. Treasury, the only open gold market after 1939. Roosevelt's temporary gambit to bring Japan to its senses, not its knees, was thwarted, however, by opportunistic bureaucrats. Dean Acheson, his handpicked administrator, slyly maneuvered to deny Japan the dollars needed to buy oil and other resources for war and for economic survival. Miller's lucid writing and thorough understanding of the complexities of international finance enable readers unfamiliar with financial concepts and terminology to grasp his explanation of the impact of U.S. economic policies on Japan. His review of thirty-seven studies of Japan's resource deficiencies begs the question of why no U.S. agency calculated the impact of the freeze on Japan's overall economy. His analysis of a massive OSS-State Department study of prewar Japan clearly demonstrates that the deprivations facing the Japanese people were the country to remain in financial limbo buttressed its choice of war at Pearl Harbor. Such a well-documented study is certain to be recognized for its significant contributions to the historiography of the origins of the Pacific War.