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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

- The Myth of Neutrality

Om Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.

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  • Språk:
  • Engelsk
  • ISBN:
  • 9781107032613
  • Bindende:
  • Hardback
  • Sider:
  • 390
  • Utgitt:
  • 15. april 2013
  • Dimensjoner:
  • 163x238x26 mm.
  • Vekt:
  • 688 g.
  • BLACK NOVEMBER
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Leveringstid: 2-4 uker
Forventet levering: 20. desember 2024

Beskrivelse av Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.

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