Probability and Inference

Recent advances in philosophy, artificial intelligence,
mathematical psychology, and the decision sciences have
brought a renewed focus to the role and interpretation of
probability in theories of uncertain reasoning. Henry E.
Kyburg, Jr. has long resisted the now dominate Bayesian
approach to the role of probability in scientific inference and
practical decision. The sharp contrasts between the
Bayesian approach and Kyburg's program offer a uniquely
powerful framework within which to study several issues at
the heart of scientific inference, decision, and reasoning
under uncertainty.
The commissioned essays for this volume take measure of the scope and impact of Kyburg's views on probability and scientific inference, and include several new and important
contributions to the field.
Contributors:
Gert de Cooman,
Clark Glymour,
William Harper,
Isaac Levi,
Ron Loui,
Enrique Miranda,
John Pollock,
Teddy Seidenfeld,
Choh Man Teng,
Mariam Thalos,
Gregory Wheeler,
Jon Williamson, and
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.