On Plato's Concept of Reason

AnyworkonthePlatonicconceptionofreasonhastowrestlewithafew signaldifficultiesoftheproblem.ThefirstisthatPlatohasnoexplicittheoryof 'reason'assuchinanyofhisworks.Thereis,forexample,nonotionof¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿in Plato:astrictlyandpreciselydefinedprincipleofcogitativepowerthatmakesa humanbeingtobewhatitessentiallyis.Initsplace,awideandvariedarrayof Greektermsisrenderedby'reason':¿¿¿¿,¿¿¿¿¿,¿¿¿¿¿¿,and¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿allshowup, atsomepointoranother,as'reason'intranslation.Ofalloftheseitisperhaps¿¿¿¿, sometimesalsotranslated'mind',thatcomesclosesttowhatweordinarily understandbytheterm.Thissimilarity,however,isdeceptive.Theproblemwith ¿¿¿¿isthatithasitsownregisterofmeaninginthecontextofAncientGreek philosophymoregenerally,throughtheinfluenceofAnaxagoras,forwhom¿¿¿¿ wasthe¿¿¿¿¿¿¿principleofbeing1.¿¿¿¿inthePhaedo(wherePlatoisexplicitly referringtoAnaxagoras)meanssomethingquitedifferentfrom¿¿¿¿inthePhaedrus (whereitisthefacultybywhichhumanbeingsapprehendthetruthintheirjourney aroundtheheavens),andbothoftheseinstancesofusagearequitedifferentfrom themodernideaof'reason'.Broadlyspeaking,however,wecansaythatthesetwo dialoguesuse'¿¿¿¿'accordingtotwodifferent,andopposite,acceptations: 'subjective'and'objective'¿¿¿¿